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1. INTRODUCTION
Constitution making in post-conflict states is in the midst of a
conceptual transformation. Traditionally these constitutions have
been viewed as power maps that are products of elite-brokered
deals, often written by foreign experts.1 The process generally
takes place outside of the public eye with no input from average
citizens or civil society. Such constitutions tend to regulate the
distribution of political, economic, and social power in ways that
address the concerns and interests of the elite drafters. This has led
to the adoption of constitutions that entrench the political power of
the elite drafters, limit the development of competitive political
opposition, and fail to create institutional and procedural
mechanisms for addressing existing and future political, economic,
or social conflicts.
Rwanda adopted a different approach, a participatory
approach. 2 The Legal and Constitutional Commission ("LCC"),
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1 See, e.g., H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism:
Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993) (conceptualizing constitutions as power maps).
2 This approach was undertaken in an effort to implement participatory
constitution-making. The Legal and Constitutional Commission ("LCC") sought
public involvement in the process because it viewed the opinions of each citizen
as vital for making the constitution a "common denominator of all Rwandans."
Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, The Commission Started Gathering
Views on the Draft Constitution (Jan. 15, 2002), http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/
eng/news001.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) [hereinafter The Commission Started
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. In t'l. L.
the body responsible for drafting Rwanda's 2003 Constitution,
traveled throughout the country to discuss the state's future
constitution with Rwandan citizens. 3 The LCC members attended
public meetings in which citizens had the opportunity to share
their concerns, ideas, and recommendations. 4
The literature on participatory constitution making contends
that citizen participation facilitates democratization by grounding
the state's governance system in a set of principles and practices
for which there is a national consensus. 5 The process by which the
Gathering Views]; see also Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Give Us
Your Suggestions, http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/suggestions.htm (last visited Oct.
21, 2007 [hereinafter Give Us Your Suggestions] ("In order to establish the
Constitution that suits all Rwandans, we call upon every person who will go on
this site internet to give advice and views which will be considered while
elaborating the Constitution."). The resulting Constitution is, however,
remarkably similar to those drafted exclusively by elites with one notable
exception -women's political participation. The Constitution requires thirty
percent of the members of both legislative houses to be women, which led to the
election of 39 women to the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Rwanda's
parliament) in 2003. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 62, 76, 82;
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments: World Classification,
Sept. 30, 2003, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif30093.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2007) (48.8% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies are women).
This represents the largest percentage of women, 48.8%, sitting in a lower or
single legislative house. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National
Parliaments: World Classification, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/
classif310107.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Women make up 45.3% of Rwanda's
national parliament (both chambers), ranking second to Sweden's single chamber
parliament, which is 47.3% female. Id.
3 Throughout this article, I use the term "citizen" to refer to an individual
residing within the post-conflict state rather than a narrower legal category of
individuals entitled to particular rights and benefits within a given state.
4 The LCC accepted both oral and written communication from citizens.
Verbal communication took place at the public meetings and written
communication occurred in the form of responses to the LCC-issued
questionnaires or independently drafted recommendation reports.
5 See generally Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of
Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153, 159-60 (2001) [hereinafter Constitution-Making]
(stating that in recent constitutional experiences, citizens have criticized
constitutions written solely by elites and instead have demanded a constructive
role in the constitution drafting process); HASSEN EBRAHIM, KAYODE FAYEMI, &
STEPHANIE LOOMIS, PROMOTING A CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA (Cornmw. Human Rights Initiative, Background Paper
to accompany CHRI's Recommendations to CHOGM 1999) (1999), available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/const/constitutionalism
_booklet_1999.pdf; VIVIEN HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING
3-4 (2003), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl07.pdf
[hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (arguing that a democratic constitution
"is made in a democratic process."); Otive Igbuzor, Constitution Making in
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constitution is adopted is as important as the substance of the
document. Public dialogue and deliberation are thus essential
components of the process. 6  Rwanda used a participatory
constitution-making process, and it adopted a Constitution that
enjoys a high level of domestic support, is deemed legitimate by
the citizens, and effectively addresses a variety of issues important
to women.7 Despite these noteworthy achievements, it is equally
noticeable that the Constitution regulates political parties in ways
that entrench the ex ante power configuration. For example, the
2003 Constitution prohibited political parties from operating
offices at the local level, which limited the development of local
constituencies.8 The Constitution also states that political parties
can be banned for engaging in divisive behavior. The vague
definition of divisive behavior has had a chilling effect on the
development of robust political parties.9
Nigeria: Lessons for Making a People's Constitution (Aug. 19-24, 2001)
(unpublished discussion paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional
Development, Kibuye, Rwanda), available at http://www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/
constitutionlessons.htm (noting that a people's constitution reflects the "wishes
and aspirations of the people."). Otive Igbuzor is the Secretary for the Citizen's
Forum for Constitutional Reform, an organization founded through a Centre for
Democracy and Development project.
6 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 50 (2000) ("In a society
where there are social group differences and significant injustice, democratic
politics ought to be a process of struggle. Far from a face-off in enemy opposition,
struggle is a process of communicative engagement of citizens with one another.");
Constitution-Making, supra note 5, at 157-61 (conceptualizing constitution-making
as a negotiation, part of the conflict transformation process). Participatory
constitution-making draws heavily on participatory and deliberative democratic
ideas about the normative and instrumental value of citizen participation and
public dialogue. See, e.g., Constitution-Making, supra note 5 (describing the role of
constitution-making in transforming conflict); Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-
Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663 (2006) (discussing the
importance of democratic constitution-making in promoting peace and good
governance).
7 See Samuels, supra note 6, at n.26 (noting that the consultative process in
drafting Rwanda's Constitution resulted in a highly popular document); PRISCILLA
YACHAT ANKUT, INT'L INST. DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: CASE STUDY RWANDA 17-
18 (2005), available at http://www.idea.int/conflict/cbp (highlighting the factors
that make the Rwandan Constitution popular amongst it constituents).
8 However, the text was modified in 2005 to state that political parties may
establish offices at the national level. See Amendment No. 2 of Aug. 12, 2005,
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 2, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA (indicating that change).
9 A potentially significant opposition party, the Mouvement Ddmocratique
Rdpublicain (Democratic Republican Movement) was disbanded by the
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Within the growing literature on participatory constitution
making in post-conflict or transitional societies, there has been
insufficient analysis of issues related to institutional and
procedural design. This literature makes normative and
instrumental claims about the benefits of participatory constitution
making without analyzing the relationship between institutional
and procedural design decisions and the quality and quantity of
citizen participation. Just as there are a variety of electoral systems
that reward and penalize different types of electoral behavior, 10
there are different types of participatory systems and they differ in
their capacity to facilitate or frustrate citizen participation. This
Article introduces the concepts of external and internal
participatory systems to assist in analyzing the different types of
participatory systems used to draft constitutions in post-conflict
states. This binary provides a mechanism for identifying the
institutions and procedures that are most effective in achieving the
normative and instrumental goals of participatory constitution
making.
External participatory systems exclude citizens from the
forums in which substantive drafting decisions are made. The
drafting body is generally small and appointed by the government.
Citizens are only given the opportunity to interact with the
Transitional National Assembly in 2003, just before the first national elections
under the new Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 191-94.
10 Scholars have examined how to encourage a diverse range of candidates to
run so that citizens would have meaningful choices; how to create an environment
in which citizens feel comfortable voting for their candidate of choice; what rules
or procedures might limit the electoral success of extremist candidates; and
whether or not particular governance systems discourage extremism. See generally
DONALD L. HOROwrrZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985) (analyzing theoretical,
political, and military aspects of ethnic conflict, and discussing strategies for
conflict resolution); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991) (discussing the
challenges of constitution-making in a racially divided context); AREND LIJPHART,
PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-six
COUNTRIES (1999) (describing majoritarian and consensual governance structures
in different contexts); AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A
COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977) (comparing experiences in democracies in
heterogeneous societies); Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL.
207 (1969), reprinted in CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION
IN SEGMENTED SOCIETIES 79 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., 1974) (describing workable
forms of democratic governance in divided societies); Ben Reilly, The Alternative
Vote and Ethnic Accommodation: New Evidence from Papua New Guinea, 16
ELECTORAL STUD. 1 (1997) (examining the effects of the alternative vote system in
Papua New Guinea).
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drafting body through public meetings and written submissions.
Additionally there are few, if any, rules or guidelines ensuring that
the drafting body will systematically review and consider the
public's feedback. The alternative to this type of participatory
system is an internal system in which individuals participate,
directly or through representatives, in the drafting forums in which
substantive decisions are made. Furthermore, the agenda-setting
and decision-making rules facilitate drafters reviewing and
deliberating a wide variety of proposals.
Based on a case study of gender equity advocates in Rwanda,
external participatory systems only enable those individuals who
mobilize, obtain influential allies, and implement an effective
framing strategy" to make substantive contributions to the
constitution-making process. These factors increase the likelihood
that public comments and recommendations will be reviewed and
deliberated. Rather than opening the floodgates to democratic
governance, external participatory systems provide narrow
political opportunities that only a limited segment of the
population is able to utilize effectively. Such narrow opportunities
during the early reconstruction years in a post-conflict state can
play an important role in entrenching a commitment to democratic
governance. They do not, however, facilitate broad citizen
participation in substantive discussions and deliberations that is
necessary for achieving one of the fundamental goals of
participatory constitution making- developing a national
consensus for a set of governance principles and practices. 12
11 See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974), where the term "frame"
was first introduced to refer to "schemata of interpretation" that allow an
individual "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of
concrete occurrences . .."; see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master
Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 137
(Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (stating that the term
"frame" is used within the sociological literature on social movements to refer to
"an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and
sequences of actions within one's present or past environment .... Collective
action frames not only perform this focusing and punctuating role; they also
function simultaneously as modes of attribution and articulation.").
12 Scholars examining participatory decision-making, and advocates of such
processes, often discuss three instrumental benefits of participatory decision-
making: legitimacy, public support, and effective decisions. See, e.g., E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64 (1988)
(noting that procedural preferences linked to fairness impact citizen satisfaction
and support for legal institutions); YOUNG, supra note 6, at 5-6 (arguing that the
"legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those
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This Article is divided into four sections. Section 2 introduces
the distinction between external and internal participatory
systems. This section then discusses the participatory constitution-
making process used in Rwanda, identifying the modes of citizen
participation, the procedures governing citizen participation, and
the drafter's use of citizen comments, recommendations, and
proposals. Section 3 conceptualizes participatory constitution
making as a tool for creating democratic states by increasing
political inclusion. Social movements are a key instrument for
bringing about such changes within a society. Using the
sociological literature on social movements, this section identifies
the factors relevant for the emergence, sustainability, and success
of social movements. These factors are instructive in analyzing
who within a society is able to successfully utilize external
participatory constitution-making processes. Section 3 also argues
that Rwanda's constitution-making process exemplifies an external
participatory system in which most citizens were unable to
contribute to, or participate in, the discussions, debates, or
deliberations in which substantive decisions regarding the
constitution were made. Access to, and influence within, these
decision-making forums were limited to those that mobilized,
obtained influential allies, and implemented effective framing
strategies. Section 4 discusses the ability to achieve internal
inclusion in Rwanda. This argument is developed through an
analysis of gender equity advocates' quest for constitutional
affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had
the opportunity to influence the outcomes."); Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public
Space, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 73, 87 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992)
(noting that deliberation among political equals is the basis of democratic
legitimacy because it enables "those affected by [the general] social norms and
collective political decisions [to] have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and
adoption."); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 5, 10 (2001) (exploring ways,
based on previous documented efforts, to empower citizens to participate in the
political process); Igbuzor, supra note 5 (arguing for participatory decision-making
in Africa); Samuels, supra note 6, at 665 (arguing that the "adoption of
participatory democratic governance structures is best able to ensure peace and
legitimacy."); DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 11 (offering lessons
learned to make democratic constitution-making genuine); EBRAHIM ET AL., supra
note 5 (advocating the need for inclusive processes for the democratic betterment
of the Commonwealth); see also David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1764 (2005); Devra C. Moehler, Public Participation and
Support for the Constitution in Uganda 26 (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with
author) (testing the claim as to whether participation in constitution-making
results in more popular support for the resulting constitution).
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provisions regarding women's political participation and gender
equity in public and private life.
2. PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION MAKING
Many international actors and constitution drafters in post-
conflict states have adopted a new participatory perspective on
constitution making. Drawing on the normative claims of
participatory democratic theory, these actors start from the premise
that a democratic constitution must not only create a democratic
state but must also be created and adopted through democratic
processes. 13  Such a process must enable those who will be
governed by the constitution to participate in the drafting process,
and the process should be transparent and accountable to the
people. 14  Constitution making in post-conflict states serves a
variety of functions. First, it produces a constitution that creates
the state's governance framework, which provides for the
allocation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions, details
citizens' rights, and regulates access to power and resources.
Second, it becomes a forum for discussing and negotiating divisive
or contested issues that are often related to the recent armed
conflict. Third, it serves as a public resource for democratic
education, and it potentially enables a consensus-based vision of
the state's future to develop. 15 Finally, it facilitates the adoption of
a document that is both constitutive and transformative. 16
13 See Samuels, supra note 6, at 667-68 (noting that how a constitution is
drafted and adopted impacts the resulting state structure); Constitution-Making,
supra note 5, at 156-57 (arguing that "new constitutionalism" or constitution-
making as a participatory process is necessitated by the intrastate nature of recent
conflicts); DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 3-4 (emphasizing that a
constitution for diverse groups of people should be made through a democratic
process); Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making:
Challenges and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
(discussing participatory democratic theory and participatory constitution-
making); Guido Galli, The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in
Democratization (May 29, 2005) (working paper on file with Int'l IDEA).
14 See DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that norms of
transparency and accountability in daily political decision-making are now also
demanded of the constitution-making process).
15 See Samuels, supra note 6, at 667 (discussing the potential of participatory
constitution-making to provide a forum for negotiation and to begin a process of
healing and reconciliation); Constitution-Making, supra note 5, at 156-57 (arguing
that maintaining an open conversation in constitution-making deters renewed
conflicts).
16 Kirsti Samuels, State Building II: Issues of Design and Implementation: State-
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Efforts to make the constitution-making process more
democratic have focused on ensuring that citizens have the
opportunity to participate in the meetings, deliberations,
discussions, or debates regarding the content of the constitution.
The goal has been to decrease external exclusion-the ways in
which individuals are prevented from participating in the decision-
making forums.17  The assumption has been that increasing
participation will facilitate the introduction and discussion of a
variety of perspectives that will lead to innovative and effective
governance systems, significant public support for the constitution,
and domestic legitimacy for the state's governance system.
Research on recent constitution-making processes in post-conflict
and transitional states has found that more representative and
more inclusive constitution-making processes resulted in
constitutions that favored free and fair elections, greater political
equality, more social justice provisions, human rights protections,
and mechanisms for accountability. 18 This study, conducted by the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
examined twelve cases of constitution making during transitional
moments from either civil conflict or authoritarian rule.19
Building and the Political Transition After Conflict, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 171,
172 (2005).
17 See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 55 (outlining the means by which individuals
can be excluded). Mitigating external exclusion is an important task. As Doug
McAdam has noted, "excluded groups, or challengers, face enormous obstacles in
their efforts to advance group interests. Challengers are excluded from routine
decision-making processes precisely because their bargaining position, relative to
established polity members, is so weak." DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 40 (1982).
18 Samuels, supra note 6, at 668.
19 See id. (analyzing the twelve case studies covered in: CAROLYN MCCOOL,
INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION:
AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY (2004), A.A. MOHAMOUD, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: BAHRAIN CASE STUDY
(2005), J. ESTEBAN MONTES & TOMAS VIAL, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-
BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: CHILE CASE STUDY (2005), IVAN
MARULANDA, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN
DEMOCRATIZATION: COLOMBIA CASE STUDY (2004), RANDALL GARRISON, INT'L IDEA,
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: EAST TIMOR
CASE STUDY (2005), JILL COTTRELL & YASH GHAI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: FIJI CASE STUDY (2004),
RODDY BRETT & ANTONIO DELGADO, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-
BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: GUATEMALA CASE STUDY (2004), ANDREA
MEZEI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN
DEMOCRATIZATION: HUNGARY CASE STUDY (2005), EDWARD SCHNEIER, INT'L IDEA,
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: INDONESIA
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Participatory processes were also found to broaden the
constitutional agenda and prevent former combatants from
dividing state power and resources amongst themselves. 20
Constitutions that were created through constitution-making
processes that were dominated by one interest or party favored the
dominant interest or party. Those that resulted from elite pacts 21
undermined social and economic equality and "empowered actors
for whom democracy was not a priority." 22  Participatory
CASE STUDY (2005), JILL COTrRELL & YASH GHAI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: KENYA CASE STUDY
(2004), JOHN SIMPKINS, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES
IN DEMOCRATIZATION: NIGERIA CASE STUDY (EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE) (2004),
PRISCILLA YACHAT ANKUT, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING
PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: RWANDA CASE STUDY (2005), all available at
http://www. idea.int/conflict/cbp).
20 See Samuels, supra note 6, at 670 (arguing that power should not be limited
to elites and that more inclusive constitution-making increases the chance for
sustainable democracy).
21 An elite pact is an "explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified,
agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to
redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees
for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it." GUILLERMO O'DONNELL &
PHILIPPE C. SCHMITrER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 37 (1986).
22 Samuels, supra note 6, at 669. See O'DONNELL & SCHMITTER, supra note 21, at
42 (arguing that socioeconomic change can make it increasingly difficult for an
elite cartel to maintain power). Peace agreement constitutions and political
power-sharing agreements ensure that the negotiating parties will not be
permanently excluded from political power or exposed to political abuse in the
future. BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF
CIVIL WARS 27-28 (2002); Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing
Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 318,
321 (2003). Unsurprisingly, such agreements rarely address issues or interests
other than those important to the parties to the agreement. As such, democratic
reforms are incorporated to the extent that they advance the interests of the
negotiating combatants. The desire for domestic and international legitimacy can
serve as an impetus for democratic reforms, but such reforms are likely to be
restricted. For example, agreements may include provisions requiring elections at
some point in the future, but they are rarely used to determine the participants in
the first post-conflict government. See, e.g., Protocol Between the Government of
Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power
Sharing, art. 1.6.2.11, May 26, 2004 (expressing the right to vote); Political
Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the DRC: Global and
Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dec.
16, 2002 at 3-5 (outlining plans for elections after the transitional period); Protocol
of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-
Based Transitional Government, arts. 48-63, Jan. 9, 1993 [hereinafter Rwanda
Power-Sharing Agreement] (outlining the resolution of the war). But see General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 33
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constitution making also served an educational function. It
provided an opportunity to initiate democratic education in
societies that had little political freedom and few past
opportunities for citizens to participate in shaping the state's
governance framework. 23 Insufficient attention, however, has been
paid to internal exclusion and the role of institutional design
decisions in creating or facilitating such exclusion.
24
In post-conflict states a significant barrier to effective
participatory decisionmaking is exclusion. There are three
components of participation that are relevant to a discussion of
exclusion and participatory constitution making: attendance,
contribution, and engagement. 25 Attendance refers to whether or
not individuals are physically present at the participatory forum.
Attendance can be hindered despite rules allowing all members of
the community to participate. Social conventions may require or
suggest that only men, the educated, the well-off, or those
appropriately dressed participate in such forums. Absent outreach
work to address these social conventions, participation may be
I.L.M. 75 (1996) (providing for elections in 1995 but supporting, if not indirectly
guaranteeing, the electoral success of the nationalist parties).
23 See Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre
Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 43, 56-57 (2001)
(discussing the bolstering effect of participatory governance on civil society in
Brazil); Fung & Wright, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing evidence that participatory
decision-making allowed ordinary citizens to gain political wisdom through
experience rather than through the media); Samuels, supra note 6, at 669 (arguing
that the participatory process of constitution-making empowered people who
have not previously had the opportunity to shape the governance of their state in
the past).
24 Internal exclusion refers to the ways in which "people lack effective
opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora
and procedures of decision-making." YOUNG, supra note 6, at 55.
25 In discussing democratic debate, Young states:
I prefer to call to the normal condition of democratic debate a process
of struggle. In a society where there are social group differences and
significant injustice, democratic politics ought to be a process of struggle.
Far from a face-off in enemy opposition, struggle is a process of
communicative engagement of citizens with one another. People of
differing social positions or interests must struggle to raise issues
because others may be threatened by those issues or they may simply
think that different issues are more important.
YOUNG, supra note 6, at 50.
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low. 26 Second, individuals may attend the participatory forum, but
not contribute to the discussions. As with physical presence,
participation could be constrained as a result of social conventions
that address not only who can participate, but also how people
should participate. 27  Expressing different, dissenting, or
conflicting opinions, thoughts, ideas, or proposals may be seen as
inappropriate and result in social sanctions. 28  Creating an
environment in which dissent and conflict are accepted is a critical
part of inclusive participatory processes. Finally, individuals may
attend and contribute to the discussion even though their opinions,
thoughts, ideas, or proposals are in tension with dominant cultural
or political norms. Participants may, however, dismiss and not
engage such contributions because they do not fit within an
accepted conception of the common good or a common norm.29
Yet participatory communicative decisionmaking is premised on
the idea that participants will advance proposals in ways that can
persuade all participants. This requires rooting one's comments in
an accepted notion of some common goods or norms. While
participants are supposed to be open to considering reasons and
justifications that conflict with their antecedent preferences and
interests, it will be difficult for them to examine and reevaluate
their conceptions of common goods or norms.30 Thus identifying
26 See Archon Fung, Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices
and Their Consequences, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 338, 347-48 (2003) (suggesting outreach
work as a means of alleviating participation bias based on socioeconomic class).
27 See infra text accompanying notes 159-65 for a discussion of the effect of
social conventions on women's participation in Rwanda's national constitutional
conference.
28 Cf. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 295 (1983) ("When
the assumption of common interest makes conflict illegitimate, a polity may no
longer tolerate dissent.").
29 See id. at 293-98; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONs Do 26 (2001) (discussing social conformity and the mechanisms of
group polarization); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL 67, 73 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) [hereinafter Toward a Deliberative
Model] (arguing that deliberative democracy requires equal and symmetrical
participation and the right to question both topics of conversation and discourse
procedure). Limited attendance and limited contributions by those in attendance
constrain the information available to participants and the types of arguments
available for consideration.
30 See Toward a Deliberative Model, supra note 29, at 71 (stating that the
challenge to democratic rationality is arriving at a common good despite
inevitable societal value-pluralism); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in
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and working with prevailing conceptions of common goods and
norms become important aspects of communicating effectively
within participatory forums.
31
The framers of participatory constitution-making processes
generally work to limit exclusion in the first two components of
participation: attendance and contribution. Outreach work is
often undertaken by local government, non-governmental
organizations, inter-governmental organizations, and local social
movement organizations to encourage citizens to attend and
contribute during the participatory forums. 32 Less work, however,
is put toward addressing the lack of engagement experienced by
many individuals and organizations. Minimal engagement in
Rwanda appears to be one of the more significant ways in which
individuals and organizations were denied an opportunity to
influence the LCC deliberations.
33
2.1. External and Internal Participatory Systems
Analytically it is useful to distinguish amongst the various
participatory constitution-making systems currently being utilized.
Recent efforts to include the public in constitution-making
Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95, 100 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
31 See infra Section 3 (discussing framing and the importance of SMOs using
frames that resonate with relevant decision-makers and the broader public).
32 Social movement organizations can similarly play a role in mitigating
exclusion that results from a failure to engage. They can mobilize, organize, and
strategically frame their arguments, ideas, and proposals in ways that are
congruent with dominant conceptions of the common good or common norms.
Such framing enables the arguments, ideas, or proposals to be critically engaged
within the participatory forums of the constitution-making process.
There may in fact be times in which particular segments of a society are
interested in advancing ideas and proposals that cannot be linked to any aspect of
dominant conceptions of the common good or common norms. In such cases,
strategic framing will not be useful. It is my contention, however, that social
movement organizations seeking to deepen democratic reforms in post-conflict
states will in fact be able to link their goals to dominant conceptions of common
norms or a common good. Norms regarding equality, justice, and freedom are
prevalent, in great part as a result of the diffusion of international human rights
norms. Conflicts regarding the implementation of such norms will exist and they
will manifest themselves differently in different societies. It is for these types of
conflicts that social movement organizations can utilize strategic framing to
facilitate engagement within participatory forums to assist in the resolution of
such conflicts.
33 See text accompanying notes 60-64 (discussing the limited number of
public comments reviewed by the LCC).
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processes have employed various combinations of the following
three-stage process, which focuses on addressing external
exclusion. First, the government arranges public meetings
throughout the country in which individuals discuss what they
believe the current political system does well, explain their
concerns with the current political system, identify new matters for
the constitution to address, and develop innovative ideas for
addressing the concerns and new matters that have been raised.
Second, a national committee or commission reviews the feedback
received during the consultation process and drafts a new
constitution. Third, the draft constitution is put to a national
referendum for approval. Each stage provides for different types
of participation in terms of quantity and quality. Institutional
design decisions regarding which stages to utilize and how to
implement them influence the capacity of individuals and
organizations to experience internal inclusion.
The ability of participatory constitution making to achieve the
normative and instrumental goals its adherents articulate varies
based on the modes of participation provided, the method by
which the drafters are selected, the manner in which the drafting
body makes decisions, and how the public information is utilized
in the drafting process. Participatory constitution-making systems
as a category address external exclusion, but they vary in the
extent to which they facilitate internal inclusion due to process
design choices regarding the above-noted factors.
The typology of participatory constitution-making systems
introduced below assists in better analyzing the effects of utilizing
participatory constitution making in post-conflict states. Based on
the importance of facilitating internal inclusion, there are two
broad categories of participatory systems: external participatory
systems and internal participatory systems.34  External
34 Rwanda provides a good case for examining constitution-making in Africa
because the Rwandan process mirrors the most frequent type of participatory
process utilized in Africa. The key features of that process are that the drafting
body has fewer than fifteen key decision-makers, the members of the drafting
body are appointed by the government, a national approval referendum is held,
and there are no initial negotiations to create the constitution-making process. See
JENNIFER WIDNER, CONSTITUTION WRITING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 10, 12 (U.N.
Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research ed., 2005), available at
http:/ /www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2005/rp2005-51.pdf
(explaining the styles of participation utilized by different countries and regions).
Twenty-four of the eighty-four African countries reviewed utilized this type of
participatory process. Id. Rwanda's process is also representative of other
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participatory systems exclude the public from the forums in which
substantive decisions about the constitution are made, but allow
the public to interact with the drafting body in a consultative
capacity. This is often accomplished through public meetings and
written submissions. Internal participatory systems include
citizens in the substantive decision-making forums directly or
through representatives, and the agenda-setting and decision-
making rules facilitate the review and consideration of a wide
variety of proposals.
External participatory systems are also characterized by a
predominant focus on gathering support for, and increasing the
legitimacy of, a specific governance system. In such systems
political elites envisage a particular governance system, and they
consult the public in an effort to gain support for their vision. The
public consultation process is likely to involve a significant amount
of civic education and information about the benefits and
disadvantages of various constitutional options. The process will
also enable individuals to discuss concerns and offer ideas or
proposals. The level of openness to such recommendations or
proposals will depend upon how they fit with the governance
system envisioned by the elite. In internal participatory systems
political elites seek public involvement in creating the governance
system. Public participation facilitates the development of a
national consensus for a set of principles and practices regarding
political participation and resolving political, economic, and social
conflicts. External participatory systems focus on obtaining
support for an elite-designed governance system while internal
systems seek to engage the public in creating that system.
These goals influence the institutional and procedural choices
made when designing and implementing a participatory system
for constitution making. In external systems political elites
maintain control over access to the drafting body and information
regarding the process. Such control is often exercised by creating a
drafting body comprised of representatives of specific interests
within the country deemed important by the government,
appointing members of the drafting body, and providing general
processes in Africa because of the extensive public consultation with ordinary
people that took place during the preparation of the draft. Widner finds that
43.2% of the African countries reviewed consulted the public during the
preparation of the initial draft and 41.3% of such countries provided opportunities
for ordinary citizens to participate. Id. at 12-13.
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rather than specific information to the public about substantive
developments in the process. Citizen participation is channeled
toward consultative activities such as public meetings, which serve
two purposes. First, public meetings enable government officials
to educate the public about the role of a constitution and the
governance options available. Second, they provide an
opportunity for individuals to share their ideas, grievances, or
proposals with the members of the drafting body and fellow
participants. These modes of participation convey the
government's interest in citizen opinions, which is an important
development in a state's democratization process. 35  Despite
widespread public consultation being a critical aspect of external
participatory systems, there are few rules or procedures governing
how the drafting body should review and consider the information
received from the public. For example, Rwanda's Legal and
Constitutional Commission ("LCC") issued an action plan in which
it stated its intention to create a database cataloging individual
responses to the LCC-issued questionnaire. The database,
however, was only to include seven percent of the returned
questionnaires selected at random. 36  The internal LCC rules
required the LCC members to consult the public and gather ideas
about the type of constitution that would best suit the country, but
the rules only required the members to furnish reports about their
individual participation in public consultation forums. 37 There are
no guidelines for recording ideas or proposals offered during the
public meetings or for reviewing them and presenting them to the
LCC as a whole. 38
35 Many post-conflict states have long histories with authoritarian regimes in
which citizen concerns and opinions were disregarded. See, e.g., CLAUDE AKE,
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 4-5 (1996) (explaining how African
countries transitioning to post-colonial authority failed to empower common
citizens).
36 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTION
FOR RWANDA: ACTION PLAN 2002-2003, at 15 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter ACTION
PLAN].
37 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, INTERNAL RULES FOR THE
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION art. 9 (Mar. 21, 2001).
38 The focus on legitimacy and support in external participatory systems is
exemplified in the requirement that LCC members are to defend the positions of
the LCC. Id. Rather than engage in critical discussions with the public and
amongst themselves about the elite-created governance system in an effort to
create the most effective system for the society as a whole, LCC members were
required to defend it.
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In what I term internal participatory systems, there is a broadly
representative drafting body representing all citizens within the
state. The representatives to this body are freely chosen by their
constituents. There are mechanisms for the representatives to
ascertain the ideas, grievances, or proposals of their constituents
and be accountable to them. The process also facilitates public
dialogue amongst citizens and between citizens and members of
the drafting body. Finally, rules regulate how the drafting body
responds to proposals from citizens. This type of system enables
more citizens to contribute to the substantive discussions and
deliberations regarding the constitution. Rather than seeking mere
public support for an elite-created governance system, internal
participatory systems seek to give individuals residing in a post-
conflict state the opportunity to influence the substance of the
constitution.
39
2.2. Participatory Constitution Making in Rwanda
On December 13, 1999, Rwanda's Transitional National
Assembly ("TNA") enacted legislation creating the Legal and
Constitutional Commission. The LCC was tasked with preparing a
draft constitution, drafting bills for laws to govern during the
transition period, and reconciling all laws with the new
constitution. In undertaking these tasks the LCC was to obtain the
views of the population, make use of examples from other
countries, and explain what a constitution is to the general
population.40 Rwanda's constitutional review process was initially
proposed in the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement ("APA" or "Arusha
Agreement"), which was negotiated to end the armed conflict in
Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 when fifty members of the
Rwandan Patriotic Army crossed into Rwanda from Uganda near
39 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 6, at 5-6 ("The normative legitimacy of a
democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have
been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to
influence the outcomes."); Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1,
16 (1995) ("Democracy is about participating. Participation matters. It matters
because the decisions that governments make affect everyone. Respect for those
decisions, including those with which we disagree, demands meaningful
participation in the decision making process.").
40 See ACTION PLAN, supra note 36, at 3 (laying out the initial charge of the
Legal and Const'.utional Commission); Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const.
Comm'n, Our Mission and Objectives, http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/mission.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) (outlining Commission objectives).
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Kagitumba and opened fire on Rwandan border guards.41 The
APA was never fully implemented before the Spring 1994 genocide
in which approximately 800,000 individuals were killed.42 When
the Rwandan Patriotic Army successfully ended the genocide and
took control of the state's government, it decided to implement the
APA.
43
The LCC had twelve commissioners who were elected by the
Transitional National Assembly. 44 Eight members represented the
eight officially registered political parties, one represented the
army and national police, two represented civil society, and one
represented the private sector.45 The composition of the TNA was
based on the Arusha Agreement, which gave each of the then-
existing political parties and the military a set number of seats.
Each party was responsible for appointing its own TNA
Deputies. 46  The LCC was a mirror of the political interests
represented in the negotiated legislative body.
47
41 See GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE
93 (1995) (describing the attack that marked the beginning of the civil war in
Rwanda).
42 Id. at 265.
43 A modified version of the Arusha Peace Agreement ("APA") was
implemented. Provisions providing for the political participation of the
Mouvement Rdpublicain National pour la Dbnocratie et le Dveloppement (National
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) ("MRND"), former
President Habyarimana's party, were not implemented.
44 The TNA selected the twelve members from a slate of fifteen candidates.
See Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, About Our Commission,
http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/about.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
45 See NAT'L UNITY & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
SUMMIT ON UNITY & RECONCILIATION 52 (2002), available at http://www.grandslacs
.net/doc/2998.pdf [hereinafter UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT].
46 Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note 22, art. 60.
47 The APA distributed Transitional National Assembly ("TNA") seats to the
MRND, which were redistributed amongst the remaining political parties after
the genocide when the Rwandese Patriotic Front ("RPF") assumed control of the
government. At the time the APA was negotiated the various political parties had
been in existence for several years, but they had yet to stand for an election.
Commentators on Rwandan politics have described the parties as "'democrats'
who were not always of the purest type, but who had the support of a large
segment of the population for whom democracy meant peace, an end to political
corruption, financial accountability by the government and freedom of
expression." PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 133. Others have noted that "[i]t is clear
that only the parties who were willing allies of the ruling RPF could make the
final shortlist for the Constitutional Commission's membership." ANKUT, supra
note 7, at 16.
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The LCC adopted internal rules of practice and procedure and
developed an action plan to implement its mandate. The LCC's
early tasks included meeting with governance experts throughout
the world and participating in a conference on constitutional
Political turmoil in Rwanda began before the October 1990 armed attacks by
the RPF. By July 1990, President Habyarimana was facing considerable domestic
and international pressure to open up the political system, which he and his party,
the MRND, had controlled since 1973. See ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 47 (1999), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm [hereinafter LEAVE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY] (describing the pressure from various sources for
political and economic reforms). In June 1991 President Habyarimana accepted a
constitutional amendment that made multiple political parties legal. He
eventually agreed to incorporate the major opposition parties into a coalition
government. The parties in that coalition government were the MRND, the
Mouvement Ddmocratique Rpublicain (Democratic Republican Movement)
("MDR"), the Parti Social Dimocrate (Social Democratic Party) ("PSD"), the Parti
Libiral (Liberal Party) ("PL"), and the Parti Dimocratique Chritien (Christian
Democratic Party) ("PDC"). Id. at 52.
Several months after the coalition government was formed, the United States
and France orchestrated peace talks between the Rwandan Government and the
RPF, which were conducted by the Organization of African Unity. The talks
continued through July 1993 and the Arusha Accords were signed on August 4,
1993. President Habyarimana was stripped of the majority of his presidential
powers as a result of the power-sharing arrangement that called for the creation of
the Broad-Based Transitional Government ("BBTG"). The BBTG was to consist of
the RPF, the MRND, the MDR, the PSD, the PL, and the PDC. Within the
executive branch Habyarimana remained President and Faustin Twagiramungu
of the MDR became the Prime Minister. The MRND and the RPF each received
five portfolios, the MDR four portfolios, the PSD and the PL three portfolios each,
and one portfolio for the PDC. See Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note
22, art. 55 (discussing portfolios which refer to state ministries like foreign affairs,
education, or defense). The seventy-member Transitional National Assembly was
divided to give the MRND, RPF, MDR, PSD, and PL eleven seats each, the PDC
four seats, and one seat to other registered parties. Id. art. 62. Registered political
parties had to sign a political code of conduct pledge.
Efforts to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement faltered and eventually
collapsed in April 1994 after Habyarimana died in a plane crash and the genocide
of more than 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu. See Gilbert M. Khadiagala,
Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda, in ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 463 (Stephen John Stedman et al. eds.,
2002) (describing the collapse of efforts to implement the APA). The genocide
took place over the course of three months and ended in July 1994 when the RPF
military forces, the Rwandan Patriotic Army ("RPA"), took Kigali, the capital of
Rwanda. The RPF set up an interim government, the Government of National
Unity ("GNU"), with ministers that had been previously selected for the BBTG
with the exception of the MRND representatives. A national assembly was also
formed with representatives from the RPF, MDR, PSD, PL, PDC, Parti
Ddmocratique Islamique (Islamic Democratic Party), Parti Socialiste Rwandais
(Rwandese Socialist Party), the Union Dimocratique du Peuple Rwandais
(Democratic Union of the Rwandese People), and the RPA.
[Vol. 29:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/3
CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES
development attended by constitutional experts. 48 Before moving
into the public consultation phase of the process, the LCC created a
booklet entitled Fundamental Ideas on a Constitution.49  This
document provided information on the role of a constitution in
addressing five categories of issues: political power, social
problems, economic matters, human rights, and other matters.
Examples are provided from different countries and questions
specifically relevant to Rwanda are posed. For example, the
section on political power outlines three types of political regimes:
a presidential system offering the United States as an example, a
parliamentary system describing England and Ethiopia, and a
mixed or semi-presidential system providing France and Mali as
examples.50 The publication was intended to provide Rwandan
citizens with information that would enable them to participate in
public discussions about the constitution, offer proposals, and
determine whether the final constitution was suitable,5
Based on this document, the LCC prepared a handbook for
commissioners and other officials involved in facilitating the public
meetings. The Education and Awareness Manual on Constitutional
Matters is a condensed version of the Fundamental Ideas on a
Constitution.5 2 This handbook is divided into two sections with the
first section outlining the necessary features of a constitution and
providing examples from other countries. The second section
outlines Rwanda's constitutional history and Rwanda-specific
problems, such as the genocide, that the new constitution must
acknowledge and resolve.5 3 This second section identifies divisive
politics as a significant factor contributing to the genocide and
notes that to resolve the problems that caused the genocide, the
48 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, CONFERENCE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 19-24, 2001) (on file with
author).
49 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Les Idies Fondamentales d'une
Constitution [Fundamental Ideas on a Constitution], http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/
idees.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
50 Id. at 20-28.
51 Id. at 2.
52 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Module de Formation et de
Sensibilisation en Mati~re Consitutionnelle [Education and Awareness Manual on
Constitutional Matters], http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/module.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2007) [hereinafter Module de Formation et de Sensibilisation].
53 Id.
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country needs good governance, 54 justice, unity and reconciliation,
Rwandan participation in public life, a state founded upon respect
for human rights, and responsible political parties.55
This handbook was used at the district level meetings that were
held throughout the country between January and June 2002.56
The session facilitators explained the role of a constitution within a
society and matters such as the various options available for
organizing political power and protecting civil, political, and social
rights. 57 The LCC reported that turnout at the meetings averaged
90,000 people.5 8 LCC literature states that discussions on a specific
topic at a meeting were closed when an opinion was agreed upon
by all present or, in the absence of total agreement, when a
majority agreed as determined by a vote. It appears that dissenting
views were to be noted "so as to be discussed" at a later time.5 9
The LCC also developed a sixty-item questionnaire covering
issues that the LCC saw as potentially controversial, such as land
issues, marriage, and divorce. The questionnaire was given to
citizens for completion and group discussions facilitated by the
LCC were used to gather the opinions of the illiterate portions of
54 The factors giving rise to good governance are identified as governance
founded on public participation, a government in which citizens chose their
representatives, transparent governance, adherence to the rule of law, and
governance founded on the equality of all citizens. Id. at *24-*25.
55 Id. at *24-*26, The section on political parties specifically states:
Political parties should, in their own way, rectify or change the bad
behaviour attributed to them by the population; the parties must disclose
their political beliefs and the real platform that shows how they will
contribute to solving the country's problems; the parties must avoid
sowing the seeds of divisionism among Rwandans; the parties must
accept that electoral defeat will not be a source of insecurity or the
destruction of the country; the behaviour of party leaders should set an
example to their members and all Rwandans.
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY
POLITICAL LIBERALISATION 7 (2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
library/ documents/report-archive/A400817_13112002.pdf (translating Module de
Formation et de Sensibilisation, supra note 52, at *24).
56 The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2.
57 Module de Formation et de Sensibilisation, supra note 52; see also ANKUT, supra
note 7, at 17 (describing the process of facilitating public discussion about societal
issues in a constitutional framework).
58 ACTION PLAN, supra. note 36, at 8.
59 Cf. The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2 (noting that the
Commission will take into account minority and individual views).
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the population. 60 The LCC pooled the questionnaire responses and
sorted them.61 Each answer was graded "according to pertinence
and where it came from (an individual person, a group of persons,
an expert in a specific area, an institution or a department [])."62
After cross-checking the accuracy of the public's feedback, the LCC
began drafting the constitution. In September 2002, the LCC
issued a booklet presenting a summary of the information gathered
during the LCC's consultation with the public. 63 The foreword to
the publication states that it "was prepared with the help of ideas
contributed by all citizens. Its publication is a deliberate intention
to present to all people their constitution ideas after analysing
them. Most of the ideas are those contributed by the majority." 64
The LCC prepared a draft constitution that it presented to a
select group of individuals at a three-day national conference in
November 2002.65 The conference is reported to have been
attended by 500 to 800 individuals. These individuals were
selected for different purposes; some were international experts
whose participation was to ensure that the draft constitution
conformed to international standards, while others represented
specific interests within Rwandan society. 66 Subsequent drafts
were circulated in December 2002 and February 2003. The
February 2003 draft was presented to the Council of Ministers and
the TNA. Various parliamentary committees discussed the draft
60 See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 16-17 (detailing LCC Chair Tito Rutaremara's
description of the process).
61 ACTION PLAN, supra note 36, at 15. It is unclear exactly how many
questionnaires were coded, but the 2002-2003 Action Plan anticipated randomly
selecting seven percent of the questionnaires to review.
62 UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 45, at 53.
63 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Fundamental Ideas on the New
Constitution (Sept. 2002), http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/fundamentalIdeas.doc
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Fundamental Ideas Report].
64 Id. at 1.
65 ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; c.f. U.N. Dev. Fund for Women [UNIFEM],
UNIFEM Action and Analysis, in Issue Brief on Justice (Nov. 2002),
http://www.womenwarpeace.org/Portals/0/Documents/justice-archive.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter UNIFEM Justice Brief] (recognizing the
inclusion of women at November's national drafting conference).
66 The Rwandan government selected the participants for this national
conference. See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; see also UNIFEM Justice Brief, supra
note 65 ("In November 2002, the government called a national conference to
review the draft constitution. At this time, UNIFEM successfully lobbied for the
increase of the percentage of women at the conference to be increased from 6% to
20%.").
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constitution with the LCC in March 2003 and a parliamentary
debate was held in April 2003.67 The TNA amended the draft,
which the LCC presented to the public during a televised and
radio-broadcasted town meeting on May 18, 2003.68 The
referendum was held on May 26, 2003, and was overwhelmingly
approved by 93.4% of the voters.69 Eighty-seven percent of the
population participated in the referendum. 70 The Supreme Court
approved the new constitution on June 2, 2003, and President
Kagame signed it on June 4, 2003.
71
The participatory system utilized in Rwanda did not allow
citizens to participate in the substantive drafting deliberations
directly or through freely chosen representatives. Those sessions
were limited to LCC members, who were selected by an appointed
legislative body. The LCC mirrored the delicate political balance
of the TNA and its members were political allies of the Rwandese
Patriotic Front ("RPF"). 72 In contrast to internal participatory
systems, citizens attempting to participate in an external
participatory system must have an ally on the drafting committee,
someone who is able and willing to promote their ideas and
advocate their positions during the drafting deliberations. This can
be a hard relationship to develop when the members of the
drafting body are not mandated to advance the interests of any
particular segment of the society. In Rwanda, the LCC members
were selected to represent the broad categories of civil society, the
private sector, and the political interests of political parties that had
no firmly established constituents. 73 Citizens did not have a
67 ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18.
68 See Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Le Prisident de la
Rpublique a Promulgu6 la Nouvelle Constitution [The President of the Republic
Approved the New Constitution] (June 4, 2003) http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/
actualite015.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Nouvelle Constitution]
(mentioning the participatory structure in the constitution-making process);
Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Current Status of the Commission
(May 18, 2003), http://www.ccr.gov.rw/eng/news005.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2007) ("On Sunday 18th may [sic] 2003 members of the Legal and Constitutional
Commission conducted a live talk show on the national TV and radio.").
69 Nouvelle Constitution, supra note 68.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See AN-KuT, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that only "willing allies" of the RPF
were ultimately granted membership to the Constitutional Commission).
73 See infra text accompanying note 79 (discussing the development of
Rwandan political parties and noting that these parties had never stood for an
election).
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specific drafting body member responsible for representing their
interests in the way that they do when the drafting body is an
elected assembly. The LCC encouraged citizens to approach the
LCC as a single entity accessible to all rather than to seek out
specific representatives for particular interests. For example, the
LCC website invited citizens to direct their comments to the
President, Vice President, and Executive Secretary of the LCC
rather than directing civil society matters to the civil society
representatives or military issues to the army and national police
representative. 74
While citizens generally face challenges getting legislative
representatives to advance their specific interests or proposals,
most citizens in an external participatory system have no dedicated
representative. They are left to convince one or more of the
appointed drafters that their interests and concerns are worth
advancing or that they have a responsibility to do so. Women's
organizations in Rwanda were successful at this task, but it
entailed mobilizing gender equity advocates, 75 developing and
implementing an effective framing strategy, and obtaining
influential allies. This required framing their claims for
constitutionally protected political participation rights for women
in a way that was consistent with the LCC's and RPF's governance
frames.
Incorporating the ideas of the citizenry to make the constitution
a "common denominator" amongst all citizens is common rhetoric
for government officials utilizing participatory constitution
making. 76 Yet, as discussed in Section 2.1, the immediate goal of
74 This strategy is in no doubt related to the RPF's anxiety about the political
representation of specific interests. See infra text accompanying note 191
(expressing Paul Kagame's concerns about localized elections and the strong
ethnic identities of political parties in Rwanda).
75 Mobilization is "[t]he process by which a group goes from being a passive
collection of individuals to an active participant in public life." DICTIONARY OF
SOCIOLOGY 420 (John Scott & Gordon Marshall eds., 3d ed. 2005).
76 See, e.g., The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2 (reporting that
LCC President Rutaremara "emphasized that views of each Rwandan are vital so
as that constitution will be a common denominator of all Rwandans."); accord Give
Us Your Suggestions, supra note 2 ("In order to establish the Constitution that suits
all Rwandans, we call upon every person who will go on this site internet [sic] to
give advice and views which will be considered while elaborating the
Constitution."); cf. Ahmed Issack Hassan, Introductory Document on the Whole
Process (Sept. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
International Law) (discussing means by which the voices of Kenyan citizens were
incorporated in the constitutional review process in Kenya).
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most officials is to obtain support for a specific governance system
and have it deemed legitimate domestically and internationally.
The fragility of the new democratic institutions, the nascent civil
society, and the uncertainty over the goals of other communities or
political organizations within the state induce anxiety about
releasing total control to the citizenry to create the state's new
governance system. Thus external participatory systems are more
likely to be implemented. Such systems, however, pay insufficient
attention to one of the most important instrumental benefits of
participatory decisionmaking- developing a national consensus
for a set of governance principles and practices. This benefit
requires that citizens either participate in (directly or via
representatives) or contribute to the discussions and deliberations
in which substantive decisions about the constitution are made.
Realizing this benefit requires the use of internal participatory
systems.
2.3. Exclusion in Rwanda
Rwanda's participatory system for constitution making
emphasized widespread consultation rather than inclusive
deliberation. Consequently, only the ideas, concerns, and
proposals of select interests within the society were seriously
discussed and deliberated by the LCC. The deliberative aspects of
participatory democratic theory suggest that deliberative forums in
which individuals exchange and challenge ideas and proposals
regarding a state's constitution with the use of arguments,
narratives, greetings, or rhetoric will enable drafters to identify the
most appropriate and effective constitutional provisions for
creating an inclusive governance system. This process took place
in Rwanda but the breadth of interests, groups, and societal
segments participating was much narrower than that advocated by
deliberative and participatory democratic political theorists. 77
One of the essential ideas within deliberative and participatory
democratic theory is that those who will be affected by a decision
should participate in the decision-making process. 78  Yet the
forums in which substantive decisions about the constitution were
made-the LCC meetings-were limited to LCC members. This
body comprised individuals selected to represent the eight political
77 See Banks, supra note 13.
78 See, e.g., Young, supra note 6, at 5-6; Guinier, supra note 39, at 16.
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parties, the military and national police, civil society, and the
private sector. Citizens did not participate in designing the
constitutional review process or the process for selecting the
individuals that would draft the constitution. Both tasks were
undertaken by the TNA, whose members were representatives of
political parties that came into existence in 1991 but had never
stood for an election. 79
Widespread citizen participation was channeled toward public
meetings where citizens were educated about constitutions, given
the opportunity to share their opinions, and informed that they
could submit written comments and proposals to the LCC. Certain
citizens had the opportunity to participate in a national conference
to review an early draft of the constitution. 80 Finally, there was a
national referendum for citizens to approve or reject the
constitution.
Despite statements from government officials indicating that
the consultative process would "arouse discussions from which
constructive views on the constitution will be [drawn]" and would
include debates on matters such as the role of political parties after
the transition, public opinion was incorporated based on its
prevalence and relevance. 81 A grading system was used to analyze
a portion of the feedback received, perhaps as little as seven
percent. 82 Expert opinions on a specific issue received two points,
opinions offered by interest groups received three points, and
detailed memoranda presented by groups received four points.83
The ideas, concepts, and proposals incorporated in the constitution
are reported to be those that "prevailed over the rest, by their
number and their pertinence."8 4
79 PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 122, 124-25. The TNA created the LCC, selected
thirteen of fifteen candidates to be the LCC members, and designed the
constitution review and drafting process.
80 Reports indicate that between 500 and 800 individuals took part in this
conference. ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; see also UNIFEM Justice Brief, supra note 65
(discussing the participation of the Forum of Rwandan Women in the national
conference to review the drafted constitution).
81 The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2; ANKUT, supra note 7,
at 14.
82 ACTION PLAN, supra note 36, at 15 (specifying that seven percent of the
feedback received from regional questionnaires would be randomly selected for
analysis).
83 See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18 (describing the process of assigning point
values to feedback received from various sources).
84 UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 45, at 55.
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Rwandan citizens had direct access to the constitution drafters
but unlike cases in which a national assembly is convened to draft
the constitution, citizens did not have appointed representatives
within the LCC. When the drafting body met to discuss,
deliberate, and draft, the only citizens whose proposals were
considered were those who successfully mobilized to submit a
detailed memorandum as a group and obtained an advocate
within the drafting body. Citizens interested in influencing the
substance of the new constitution had to devise strategies for
obtaining the attention and support of the drafters.85  The
organizing efforts of gender equity advocates suggest the elements
of a successful strategy -mobilizing, cultivating influential allies,
and framing proposals in ways that are consistent with the
governance frames of the country's political elites.
8 6
3. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONSTITUTION MAKING
Participatory constitution making in post-conflict states is part
of a larger effort to create a democratic state. It provides an
opportunity for excluded groups to solidify their political
participation through legal guarantees. Taking advantage of that
opportunity requires significantly more than submitting proposals
or recommendations to the constitution-drafting body.
Adopting the conception of political power outlined in Doug
McAdam's political process theory, political power in post-conflict
states is concentrated in the hands of a few, and most individuals
within the society are deprived of the opportunity to influence
major decisions affecting their lives.8 7 This power, however, is not
85 Processes that utilize national assemblies enable a potentially wide range
of citizens to have advocates participating in the drafting process because citizens
elect the members and there are hundreds of participants. The power or strength
of the representatives will undoubtedly vary considerably, which will require
citizens to devise strategies for obtaining the support of other citizens and their
representatives.
86 I would not expect these strategies to be of trivial importance in internal
participatory systems, but they would not be necessary for individuals and
organizations to access the forums in which substantive decision-making occurs.
A key distinction between external and internal systems is the degree to which the
drafting body is regulated in how it reviews and considers public-derived
proposals and recommendations. When this process is completely unregulated,
mobilizing, obtaining allies, and strategic framing become necessary for obtaining
access to the substantive decision-making forums. When the process is regulated,
these strategies can be useful in persuading decision makers or fellow citizens, but
they are not necessary for achieving internal inclusion.
87 MCADAM, supra note 17, at 36.
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absolute. Political elites do not exercise "virtually unlimited power
in politico-economic matters" rendering excluded groups
functionally powerless. 88 Most groups within post-conflict states
have some "latent political leverage." 89 Exercising that leverage is
often hampered by a failure to recognize its existence. As noted by
McAdam, "mass political impotence may as frequently stem from
shared perceptions of powerlessness as from any objective inability
to mobilize significant political leverage." 90
Successful attempts by excluded members of society to obtain
political, economic, or social inclusion is related to political
opportunities that are made available by elites, recognition by the
excluded of their transformative power, and framing their reform
proposals in ways that resonate with political elites and the public
at large. Participatory constitution making offers a new political
opportunity, but it is an opportunity within a context of
conservative elite control. According to Charles Tilly this
conservatism encourages elites to "resist changes which would
threaten their current realization of their interests even more than
they seek changes which would enhance their interests." 91
Further, they
fight tenaciously against loss of power, and especially
against expulsion from the polity. They work against
admission to the polity of groups whose interests conflict
significantly with their own.
Existing members tend to be more exacting in their
demands of contenders whose very admission would
challenge the system in some serious way. 92
88 Id. at 37.
89 See id. (noting that excluded groups' political leverage "comes from the
'structural power' that their location in various politico-economic structures
affords them").
90 Id. at 37-38; see also KURT SCHOCK, UNARMED INSURRECTIONS: PEOPLE POWER
MOVEMENTS IN NONDEMOCRACIES 27 (2005) ("For the oppressed to engage in
collective action, there must first be cognitive liberation, that is, a diminution of
fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to
change through collective action.").
91 CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 135 (1978) [hereinafter
MOBILIZATION].
92 Id.
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This approach not -only applies to individuals and
organizations advocating goals contrary to the interests of the
political elites, but it also applies to those with moderate goals
"who simply pressure for membership in the competitive
establishment. For any change in the makeup of the polity is
inherently disruptive of the institutionalized status quo and thus
something to be resisted." 93
Rwanda's constitution-making experience suggests that the use
of participatory constitution making does not eradicate political
elite conservatism, rather it highlights the conservatism. Excluded
groups can use participatory constitution-making processes to
obtain greater political, economic, and social inclusion, but only
when they engage in sustained and highly coordinated collective
action. Such action entails identifying useful political
opportunities beyond the constitution-making process, such as
influential allies; obtaining access to resources that assist in
facilitating mobilization and legitimizing the organizations' goals;
and framing the organizations' target goals in ways that are
congruent with the goals of the political elites and resonate with
the general public. These strategies assist excluded groups in
obtaining internal inclusion during a participatory constitution-
making process.
Internal inclusion occurs when individuals have an "effective
opportunity to influence the thinking of others... when they have
access to fora and procedures of decision-making." 94 Young
contrasts internal inclusion with internal exclusion, which occurs
when
[h]aving obtained a presence in the public, citizens
sometimes find that those still more powerful in the process
exercise, often unconsciously, a new form of exclusion:
others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and
expressions. Though formally included in a forum or
process, people may find that their claims are not taken
seriously and may believe that they are not treated with
equal respect. The dominant mood may find their ideas or
93 MCADAM, supra note 17, at 39. As noted by William Gamson, "[t]he
competitive establishment is boundary-maintaining." William A. Gamson, Stable
Unrepresentation in American Society, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Nov.-Dec. 1968, at
15, 20.
94 YOUNG, supra note 6, at 55.
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modes of expression silly or simple, and not worthy of
consideration.
95
Internal exclusion can be mitigated by channeling individual
participation through social movement organizations. Social
movement organizations are complex or formal organizations that
work to implement a set of goals that mirror the preferences of a
social movement or countermovement. 96 A social movement is
sustained collective action by individuals with "preferences for
changing some elements of the social structure" who make new or
unaccepted claims upon the state. 97  Such movements are
comprised of individuals who lack regular access to state
institutions and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge
society and/or authorities.98 Social movement organizations use a
95 Id. William Gamson makes a similar distinction between members and
challengerg within political society. WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL
PROTEST 140 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter SOCIAL PROTEST] ("The central difference
among political actors is captured by the idea of being inside or outside of the
polity. Those who are inside are members whose interest is vested- that is,
recognized as valid by other members. Those who are outside are challengers.
They lack the basic prerogative of members-routine access to decisions that
affect them.").
96 John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. Soc. 1212, 1217 (1977).
97 Id. at 1218 (noting that a countermovement is "a set of opinions and beliefs
in a population opposed to a social movement."); see also SIDNEY TARROW, POWER
IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 3 (2d ed. 1998)
(describing collective action "used by people... who act in the name of new or
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others
or authorities.").
98 See TARROW, supra note 97, at 2-4; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1217-
18 (describing a social movement as individuals seeking to change some elements
of social structure and/or reward distribution); see also MCADAM, supra note 17, at
37 (discussing social movements as "rational attempts by excluded groups to
mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests."); William A.
Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 275, 283 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy,
& Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS] (defining a social movement as "a sustained and self-conscious
challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors (organizations and
advocacy networks), some of whom employ extrainstitutional means of
influence."); David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow, The Social Movement Society:
Contentious Politics for a New Century, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY:
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 1, 4 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow
eds., 1998) (noting that the social movement repertoire of contention has become
institutionalized in advanced industrial democracies); Tomiko Brown-Nagin,
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L.
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variety of institutional and non-institutional strategies to make
their claims and sustain their interaction with political officials,
legal decision makers, and the general public. 99 They also provide
individual citizens with the resources, strategies, and support that
facilitate internal inclusion in an external participatory
constitution-making process.
In many post-conflict states the creation and implementation of
a participatory constitution-making process is controlled by
political elites. These individuals have generally obtained their
elite status through victory in an armed conflict or a negotiated
peace settlement. As with political elites in other political
environments, in post-conflict states this ruling class has a
conservative approach to maintaining the boundaries of the
political system. 100 While considerable incentives exist for these
elites to create and implement some nominal participatory
constitution-making process, there are significantly fewer
incentives to seriously review and deliberate on the comments,
proposals, or recommendations offered by most individuals or
organizations within the society. 101
REV. 1436, 1503 (2005) (defining a social movement as individuals engaged in a
"sustained, interactive campaign that makes sustained, collective claims for relief
or redistribution in response to social marginalization, dislocation, change, or
crisis."); McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1217-18 (defining a social movement
as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for
changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a
society.").
99 Institutionally based strategies target political and legal decision makers by
utilizing methods like lobbying and pursuing legal challenges. Non-
institutionally based strategies are generally employed when advocates have
limited access to political and legal institutions and/or make claims that are
incapable of being recognized within political and legal institutions. See TARROW,
supra note 97, at 3 (arguing that while most collective action occurs within
institutions, it becomes contentious when used by people who lack regular access
to institutions). These strategies include activities like demonstrations, marches,
and community education. See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1218-19
(discussing the use of social movement organizations during the civil rights
movement to represent and shape the broadly-held preferences of the social
movement); see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 98, at 1504-05 (enumerating the
collective activities engaged in by members of social movements).
100 See WALTER, supra note 22, at 29-30 (discussing the tendency of post-war
factions to "insulate themselves from future harm and to prevent their rival from
consolidating power."); SOCIAL PROTEST, supra note 95, at 20 (characterizing
political mobilization as a response to crises in the achievement of a group's
collective goals).
101 Government officials utilizing external participatory systems are
predominantly focused on gathering support for and increasing the legitimacy of
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Becoming a core participant in an externally inclusive
participatory constitution-making process requires inclusion.
Inclusion entails having an "effective opportunity to influence the
thinking" of the drafters, which requires being treated as an equal
and having one's claims taken seriously. Inclusion does not
necessarily follow from formal access to the drafting body. Social
movements and social movement organizations are mechanisms
that can facilitate core participation within externally inclusive
participatory systems. 102
Social movement organizations provide individuals with
resources, strategies, and support that assist in the quest to become
core participants. The involvement of such an organization does
not guarantee substantive success, but it significantly increases the
likelihood that its members will obtain inclusion. Absent
organized participation, there is a significant risk that an
individual's contributions, proposals, or recommendations will not
be reviewed and deliberated by the constitution drafting body.
Three main theoretical approaches have emerged in the
sociological study of social movements. Theorists examining the
emergence and sustainability of social movements have
alternatively focused on the availability of political opportunities,
access to mobilizing resources, and framing strategies. These three
factors not only influence the ability of social movement
organizations to emerge, but also the extent to which they are
sustainable and successful in obtaining their desired outcomes.
The desired outcomes of interest in this article are constitutional
solutions to the problems identified by the social movement
organizations. For example, gender equity advocates in Rwanda
sought equal protection and non-discrimination clauses in addition
to provisions guaranteeing gender equity in matters relating to
marriage and children and guaranteed representation for women
within the state's legislative bodies.
Sidney Tarrow, a leading social movement scholar, contends
that social movements emerge as a result of new political
a specific governance system. In such systems political elites envisage a particular
governance system and they consult the public in an effort to gain support for
their vision. See supra Section 2.1.
102 Other scholars such as Iris Marion Young focus on modes of political
communication to respond to internal exclusion. See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 56-57
(noting the importance of communication in establishing trust and motivating
action).
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opportunities. 103 Political opportunities refer to "consistent -but
not necessarily formal or permanent -dimensions of the political
environment that provide incentives for collective action by
affecting people's expectations for success or failure."104 The
political opportunity framework identifies increases in political
access, influential allies, divided elites, and declining state
repression as the factors providing the incentives. 105
103 TARROW, supra note 97, at 71-85. The applicability of the political
opportunity structure in non-democratic studies has been questioned. Kurt
Schock examined the relevance of political opportunities to the emergence and
success of social movement organizations in the Philippines and Burma. He
concluded that the theoretical framework has explanatory power in non-
democratic societies. Kurt Schock, People Power and Political Opportunities: Social
Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma, 46 Soc. PROBS.
355, 370-71 (1999).
104 TARROW, supra note 97, at 76-77 ("[M]ost opportunities and constraints are
situational, and cannot compensate for long for weaknesses in cultural,
ideological, and organizational resources.").
105 See id. at 71 (showing the importance of political opportunity factors in the
emergence of social movements); SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 27-30 (discussing
requisites for collective action); see also Doug McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current
Problems, Future Directions, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
supra note 98, at 23, 26-29 (outlining the dimensions of political opportunity);
Schock, supra note 103, at 356-57 (explaining the relevance of the political
opportunity framework for social movements in the Philippines and Burma).
The political opportunity framework has been critiqued as being biased
toward developed democracies, yet recent studies have demonstrated its
applicability in non-democratic contexts. For example, a study of democratization
movements in the Philippines and Burma found that elite divisions and
influential allies affected the movements' success.
Political access, the institutionalized points of access to political decision
makers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government, can be
particularly difficult in non-democratic states. In such states political power is
generally centralized within the executive branch such that legislatures and
judiciaries have little independent power. See Schock, supra note 103, at 361
(explaining limited points of access in non-democratic societies); see also AKE,
supra note 35, at 3-5 (noting the prevalence of leadership amassing and
centralizing political power in post-colonization Africa); Samuels, supra note 6, at
679-80 (explaining the inability of other branches in a fledgling government to
appropriately check and balance the executive).
Influential allies provide organizational expertise, financial assistance, and
leadership, and can lower the power discrepancy between the ruling political
elites and civil society. See Schock, supra note 103, at 361; see also Sidney Tarrow,
States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 98, at 41, 55-56
(noting the importance of influential allies in the American farm workers
movements and movements resisting Eastern European socialist regimes).
Members of the international community, foreign governments, non-
governmental organizations, and inter-governmental organizations play a
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Participatory constitution-making advocates focus exclusively
on the creation of one type of political opportunity: increased
access to political institutions. An unstated assumption within this
literature is that broadening the political space within a state will
provide a sufficient incentive to increase citizen participation and
for government officials to actively engage citizens. Such citizen
involvement and government responsiveness requires more.
Increased political access, in this case a participatory constitution-
making process, is but one type of political opportunity that is
necessary to increase individual participation through the
emergence and sustainability of social movement organizations.
The use of participatory constitution making offered a new
point of institutional access for Rwandan citizens. The public
meetings and the acceptance of written comments by the LCC
provided citizens with an opportunity to engage the constitution
drafters. The LCC's engagement with the public represented a
significant break from Rwanda's authoritarian past. Rwanda had
been a one-party state for approximately twenty years and the
significant role as influential allies in non-democratic states. These states often
lack robust and active political parties, professional associations, labor unions,
and other similar organizations, and when they do exist they are generally
controlled by the state, which limits the existence of local influential elites.
Schock, supra note 103, at 361.
Division amongst elites can provide an incentive for less empowered civil
society actors to mobilize. Such divisions can widen "the circle of conflict" to
include the civil society actors and give them marginal power as a result of some
elites taking on the role of "tribune of the people" to increase their political
influence. TARROW, supra note 97, at 56. In post-conflict states such divisions
could be more harmful than helpful in successfully designing and implementing
democratic reforms. The negotiation of a peace agreement amongst the main
combatants provides a degree of certainty and comfort to these parties. If that
certainty is undermined by significant elite divisions regarding the state's form of
political rule, armed conflict could resume. Schock found that elite divisions,
particularly divisions within the military, influenced whether repression
successfully deterred civil society activity or whether it provided a basis for civil
society mobilization. Schock, supra note 103, at 361, 369.
In non-democratic states repression is often used indiscriminately against the
entire population, and Schock found that it decreased the legitimacy of the
governing regime. Yet in Burma the state's repression also suppressed the
democratization movement. He concludes that the presence or absence of other
aspects of political opportunities influences the effect that repression will have.
The existence of elite divisions, particularly in the military, and the free flow of
alternative information, facilitated civil society mobilization in both countries.
When the elite division was reduced, influential allies did not exist, and
alternative flows of information were not available, state repression demobilized
the democratization efforts. Id. at 368.
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regime has been characterized as a dictatorship that consistently
coerced, repressed, and violated the rights of Rwandan citizens. 106
Having LCC commissioners move throughout the country to
discuss the state's new constitution represented a break from
traditional Rwandan politics. Yet, the extent to which the use of
participatory constitution making was perceived as a new political
opportunity depended upon the problems that one sought to have
addressed and how one sought to have them addressed. 107 For
example, advocates interested in advancing the interests of specific
ethnic groups were silenced due to the government's position that
ethnic-based claims undermined the state's unity and
reconciliation goals. 108
External participatory processes increase institutional access,
but they do so differentially. The usefulness of this opening will
depend on other political opportunities like influential allies,
divisions within elites, declining repression, and shifting political
alignments. Tarrow contends that the instability of political
alignments encourages contention. "[T]he changing fortunes of
government and opposition parties create uncertainty among
supporters, encourage challengers to try to exercise marginal
power, and may even induce elites to compete for support from
outside the polity. " 109
The RPF's desire for broad appeal throughout Rwanda
provided an opportunity for gender equity advocates to trade their
political support for gender equity constitutional provisions.
Taking advantage of such shifts in political alignments often
106 See PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 61, 80-90, 211-12 (documenting President
Habyarimana's reign before the genocide in Rwanda); LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE
STORY, supra note 47 (outlining Rwanda's oppressive past).
107 See TARROW, supra note 97, at 77 (noting that political opportunities "may
not be apparent all at once to all potential challengers.").
108 The politically repressive environment in Rwanda during the constitution-
making process significantly affected who was able to successfully organize and
mobilize. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14 for discussion of state
repression and political opportunities.
109 TARROW, supra note 97, at 78; see also SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 30 (noting
that "political opportunities may be even more important for challenges in
nondemocracies than in democracies, since opportunities for dissent are less
common and therefore any signs of political opportunity are likely to generate
opposition."); TARROW, supra note 97, at 78-79 (pointing out that "[in less-than-
democratic regimes, the lack of routinized competition makes any sign of political
instability a signal and a source for contention.").
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requires the support of influential allies.110 In non-democratic
states where social movement organizations have fewer internal
resources, influential allies are particularly important."' Allies
provide resources for social movement organizations such as
legitimacy, access, and material resources such as office space or
office equipment.11 2
Finally, state repression hinders the emergence and
sustainability of social movement organizations. Charles Tilly
defines repression as "any action by another group which raises
the contender's cost of collective action. An action which lowers
the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilitation."" 3
Repressive techniques are more likely to be used against social
movement organizations ("SMOs") that seek fundamental changes
within a society that threaten the political, social, and economic
power of the elite. Social movement organizations seeking modest
changes within the society are less likely to experience such
repression even within authoritarian or repressive
environments." 4
Another major theoretical perspective within the sociological
study of social movements focuses on the availability of mobilizing
resources. The level of action that an SMO can direct toward
achieving its target goals is argued to be a function of the resources
that the SMO controls." 5 Resources relevant for SMO emergence
110 William Gamson's research demonstrates a correlation between
movement success and influential allies. In the fifty-three "conflict groups" he
examined, success was closely related to the presence or absence of political allies.
SOCIAL PROTEST, supra note 95, at 64-66.
111 TARROW, supra note 97, at 80; see also SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 34 (noting
that "in nondemocracies, the Catholic Church, religious workers, development
workers, and human rights organizations and the international networks in which
they are embedded have provided crucial support for the oppressed in their
challenges to the state.").
112 See SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 33-34 (providing examples of the importance
of third party allies in political movements); TARROW, supra note 97, at 79.
113 MOBILIZATION, supra note 91, at 100 (emphasis omitted).
114 TARROW, supra note 97, at 80. The state's response to individuals and
organizations seeking political participation in Rwanda exemplifies the
differential use of state repression depending upon the nature of the claims made
against the state. Political parties that the state thought were seeking political
participation by organizing around ethnicity were declared illegal and their
leaders were charged with criminal offenses. See infra text accompanying notes
191-94. Gender equity advocates that sought guaranteed political representation
for women had a much different experience. They achieved internal inclusion
within the constitution-making process and the government more broadly.
115 John D. McCarthy, Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and
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and success in achieving its target goals are legitimacy, money,
facilities, and labor.116 McCarthy and Zald, the leading proponents
of the resource mobilization perspective on social movements,
contend that SMOs have two broad categories of people and
organizations from whom they can obtain support -adherents and
constituents. "Adherents are those individuals and organizations
that believe in the goals of the movement" while constituents
provide resources for the movement." 7 These two categories can
be further divided based upon the amount of resources the
individuals or organizations control. McCarty and Zald use the
adjective mass to refer to those individuals and organizations that
control a limited pool of resources, and elite for those that "control
larger resource pools." 118 Another important distinction to make
amongst potential resource providers is whether or not they will
directly benefit from the SMO achieving its target goals. Those
that will are termed potential beneficiaries, while those that will not
are described using the adjective conscience, such as conscience
adherents or conscience constituents. 119 SMOs that focus their
attention on beneficiary adherents for resources are classic SMOs,
in contrast to professional SMOs that direct their efforts toward
conscience adherents. 120 In Rwanda, gender equity advocates
represent a mixed classic-professional SMO. Through the umbrella
organization Collectif Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe ("Pro-
Femmes"), gender equity advocates worked with locally-based
women's organizations to transform bystanders into adherents' 21
Inventing, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 98, at
141; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1221 (noting that "resources must be
controlled or mobilized before action is possible.").
116 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1220; see also SCHOCK, supra note 90, at
29 (stating that mobilizing structures are the "networks through which the
mobilization of tangible resources, people, and organized collective action
occurs.").
117 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1221.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1221-22. William A. Gamson makes a similar distinction, referring
to social movement organizations with goals that help nonconstituents as
universalistic and those SMOs whose goals focus on constituents as
nonuniversalistic. SOCIAL PROTEST, supra note 95.
120 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1223.
121 This process of transforming bystanders into adherents generally involved
persuading individuals that they were potential beneficiaries. Madeline
Mukarwigema, a member of Duhozanye, a locally-based women's organization in
Save district, Butare, noted that
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and to utilize beneficiary adherents and elite conscience adherents
like the Rwandan Forum of Women Parliamentarians, the Ministry
of Gender, Family and Social Affairs ("MIGEPROFE"), and the
United Nations Development Fund for Women ("UNIFEM").
Government authorities play a significant role in either
frustrating or enabling SMO resource mobilization. 122 They can
influence the readiness of bystanders, adherents, and constituents
to provide resources. Such actors played a significant role in the
ability of Rwandan political organizations to mobilize around
ethnic identities. In 2002, the Mouvement D~mocratique
RCpublicain (Democratic Republican Movement) ("MDR"), a
prominent political party, was disbanded by the Transitional
National Assembly for engaging in divisionism1 23 On the other
hand, government authorities aided gender equity advocates in
their mobilization efforts. For example, the LCC worked with
UNIFEM to organize gender sensitization workshops for local
government officials throughout Rwanda before the commission
began its public consultation activities. 124
UNIFEM and other international organizations also assisted
Rwandan gender equity advocates by providing another
significant resource-a collection or inventory of successful
strategic tactics. Social movement scholars refer to this as a social
movement organizations' repertoire of contention or collective
action repertoire.1 25 When engaging in contentious politics, social
[w]e never took gender into consideration.... Before we received
training in gender, we thought that we had arrived at the summit of
sexual equality because we were doing jobs and tasks which had
previously been reserved for men only, like masonry, milking cows
etc.... After the training, we saw that we had an incomplete
understanding of gender.
WOMEN FOR WOMEN INT'L BRIEFING PAPER, WOMEN TAKING A LEAD: PROGRESS
TOWARD EMPOWERMENT AND GENDER EQUITY IN RWANDA 17-18 (2004), available at
http://www.womenforwomen.org/nrrwpap.html [hereinafter WOMEN TAKING A
LEAD].
122 SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 30-31; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1222.
123 See infra notes 193-96 for further discussion of this event.
124 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Rapport d'activits etfinancier
du projet: Contribution des femmes dans l'laboration de la prochaine Constitution
Rwandaise dans les Provinces de Kibungo-Umutara-Gitrama-Gikongoro, [Business and
Financial Report: Women's Contribution to the Development of the Rwandan
Constitution in the Kibungo-Umutara-Gitrama-Gikongoro Provinces] at *1,
http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/rapportFemmes.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
125 CHARLES TILLY, POPULAR CONTENTION IN GREAT BRITAIN 1758-1834, at 43
(1995) [hereinafter POPULAR CONTENTION]; Karen Beckwith, Gender Frames and
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movement organizations utilize a narrow set of learned and shared
routines based on past successful actions. 126 They are aware that
certain actions are more successful than others in mobilizing
supporters and enabling SMOs to achieve their target goals.
127
Rwanda's gender equity advocates received significant
assistance regarding strategic tactics from their domestic and
international elite adherents, primarily UNIFEM, the Rwandan
Forum of Women Parliamentarians, and MIGEPROFE. Pro-
Femmes primarily utilized institutional strategies. 128  The
Rwandan Forum of Women Parliamentarians was able to advise
Pro-Femmes on effective strategies for lobbying members of the
Transitional National Assembly. MIGEPROFE did so with regard
to the RPF and other executive officials. UNIFEM offered a more
global perspective on the general types of activities that Pro-
Femmes should be engaged in to transform government officials
into conscience constituents or adherents.
Decisions regarding strategic tactics are not only relevant for
the SMOs' ability to interact successfully with decision makers, but
they play a significant role in the SMOs' ability to mobilize
individuals and organizations to act. The institutional or non-
institutional strategies utilized by a social movement organization
will influence whether bystanders are transformed into adherents
and whether adherents will become constituents. A social
movement organization's selection of tactics that resonate with
individuals and organizations as strategies that could make a
Collective Action: Configurations of Masculinity in the Pittston Coal Strike, 29 POL. &
Soc'Y 297, 299 (2001).
126 POPULAR CONTENTION, supra note 125, at 43 (defining "repertoires of
contention" as "the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive
claims bearing on each other's interests."). A repertoire of contention is
comprised of "sets of learned behaviors that participants call upon and employ in
specific social movement situations, and are manifested in 'well-defined forms [of
political participation] already familiar to the participants.'" Beckwith, supra note
125, at 299 (quoting MOBILIZATION, supra note 91, at 143); see also John D.
McCarthy, Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing, in
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 98 (referring to
"agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action" as a mobilizing resource).
127 Beckwith, supra note 125, at 299-300; see also CHARLES TILLY, THE
CONTENTIOUs FRENCH 390 (1986) ("[P]eople tend to act within known limits, to
innovate at the margins of existing forms, and to miss many opportunities
available to them in principle.").
128 See supra note 99 for a discussion of institutional and non-institutional
strategies for contentious politics.
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difference will affect the SMO's recruitment efforts. 129 Getting
individuals and organizations to believe that through collective
action they can achieve their desired goals is an important function
of SMOs. As noted earlier, the availability of political
opportunities influences whether SMOs will emerge, but political
opportunities are relative, and SMOs often spend a great deal of
time and energy debating whether an open moment exists and
whether institutional or non-institutional strategies are most
appropriate.130  Consequently, deploying frames that "define
people as potential agents of their own history" and that suggest
the possibility of changing an undesirable situation through
collective action plays a significant role in mobilization. 131
The role of strategic framing in social movement emergence
and sustainability is the third significant theoretical approach to
studying social movements. Framing is one way that SMOs
attempt to align their definition of a problem and proposed
solutions with the interpretive framework of other members of the
society in order to gain adherents and constituents. 132 Alignment
requires enabling individuals to see that some set of their interests,
values, and beliefs are congruent and complementary with the
SMO's activities, goals, and ideology. 133 Two components of a
framing strategy are the diagnostic frame and the prognostic
frame. Diagnostic framing identifies the problem and attributes
blame.134 This process focuses the target audience's attention on a
specific issue and helps determine how the issue will be perceived,
which helps to focus attention on the desired outcome. 35
129 David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 464, 470 (1986) (noting that participation
in SMO activities "is more likely" when there is a positive connection "between
beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action.").
130 Gamson & Meyer, supra note 98, at 283-84.
131 Id. at 285.
132 See discussion of framing and social movements infra Section 4.2.
133 Snow et al., supra note 129, at 467 (defining frame alignment as the
conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks); Doug McAdam, The
Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil
Rights Movement, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note
98, at 340; see also Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 611, 615 (2000)
(viewing collective action frames as negotiations of shared understandings).
134 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 615.
135 Daniel M. Cress & David A. Snow, The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization:
The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing, 105 AM. J.
Soc. 1063, 1071 (2000).
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Prognostic framing addresses what is to be done about the
problem articulated by the diagnostic frame. It is "a proposed
solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the
strategies for carrying out the plan."
136
Successful frame alignment requires that the SMO frames
resonate with the broader culture and existing values to enable the
frame to appear natural and familiar. 137 SMOs draw on a variety
of cultural norms and values in constructing their frames. Gender
equity advocates in Rwanda successfully utilized international
norms and legal commitments as the substance of their prognostic
frame but also relied on RPF-articulated norms and values for their
general framing strategy. Pro-Femmes argued that it was
necessary to protect gender equity in family and political life in the
Constitution, not only to address women's marginalization, but to
136 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 616.
137 MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 70 (2002) [hereinafter
SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE] ("In all public arenas ... social problems that can
be related to deep mythic themes or broad cultural preoccupations have a higher
probability of competing successfully." (quoting Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L.
Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. Soc. 53,
71 (1988))); Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 619-22, 624 (identifying types of
collective action frames and the factors affecting resonance); Rita K. Noonan,
Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in
Chile's Transition to Democracy, 10 Soc. FORUM 81, 94 (1995).
For every resonating theme there is a competing theme that draws on
language that appears similarly natural and familiar. SHAPING ABORTION
DISCOURSE, supra at 70 ("Themes and counterthemes are paired with each other so
that whenever one is invoked, the other is always present in latent form, ready to
be activated with the proper cue." (quoting WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS
135 (1992))); see also Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 625-27 (describing framing
contests among competing viewpoint groups). Themes are carried by
organizational actors who have different levels of access to decision-making
processes and decision makers. This is another basis upon which frames are
advantaged or disadvantaged. The field in which the framing contest takes place
is not constant; it is "full of hills and valleys, barriers, traps, and impenetrable
jungles." SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra at 62.
[T]he contours of the playing field can change suddenly in the middle of
the contest because of events that lay beyond the control of the players;
and players can themselves sometimes change the contours through
actions that create new discursive opportunities. This complex playing
field provides advantages and disadvantages in an uneven way to the
various contestants in framing contests.
Id. Part of the complicated field of constitution-making processes in post-conflict
states is the significant amount of power held by political elites.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/3
CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES
promote peace, unity, and reconciliation in Rwanda. 138 The RPF's
governance frame named peace, unity, and reconciliation as the
targeted goals, and identified divisionism as a barrier to these
goals. Pro-Femmes aligned gender equity with the attainment of
these goals and created a framing strategy that did not contradict,
but was actually congruent with the RPF's governance frame.
4. ACHIEVING INTERNAL INCLUSION IN RWANDA
Women have been actively involved in identifying ways to
promote peace, unity, and reconciliation within Rwanda. Much of
this activity has taken place through grassroots and national
women's organizations. These organizations have a long history in
Rwanda. During Rwanda's early post-colonial years, the
government supported social centers for women in each
prefecture. Rural women were encouraged to meet and discuss
common problems at these centers that were staffed by young
female social workers. 139 After Juvenal Habyarimana became
president, an increasing number of grassroots organizations,
cooperatives, NGOs, and church-related groups appeared
throughout Rwanda. A 1985 survey of 133 NGOs found that the
support offered to rural women emphasized domestic
responsibilities but did not address agrarian, commercial,
intellectual, or political activities. 140 In 1987, out of 1,457 civil
society organizations, 143 were registered as women's NGOs and
these organizations sought to focus attention on the conditions
facing women and the need for women's participation in
development. 141
After years of war and genocide, women in Rwanda faced
shattered communities in which the men had been killed or had
fled. Women had to find ways to survive in these new
environments. They had to cope with the physical and
psychological harm they suffered; find food, shelter, and clothing;
and care for their children, orphans, and other relatives. The state
138 See infra text accompanying notes 182-98 for further discussion of Pro-
Femmes' framing strategy.
139 Catharine Newbury & Hannah Baldwin, Confronting the Aftermath of
Conflict: Women's Organizations in Postgenocide Rwanda, in WOMEN AND CIVIL WAR:
IMPACT, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACTION 97, 98 n.1 (Krishna Kumar ed., 2001).
140 Id. at 99 n.4 (citing INADES FORMATION RWANDA, INVENTAIR O.N.G. 1985,
at 17-18 (1985)).
141 Id. at 99.
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lacked the resources to address the material needs of the citizenry
so women began organizing to address their common problems by
building on previous rural organizations that provided economic
and social support. 142 In Kigali, women who had been active in
national women's organizations before 1994 began meeting,
offering each other support, and voicing their concerns about the
challenges facing women and children. 143 Joined by women
returning to Rwanda from exile,144 these women began to rebuild
the member organizations of the umbrella group, Pro-Femmes,
which existed before the war. As the women met and discussed
their challenges, they sought new ways to meet their needs. Out of
these discussions the women drafted the Campaign for Peace as a
blueprint for addressing Rwanda's social and economic problems
with a particular focus on the critical needs of women and
children. The Campaign for Peace proposed new ways to involve
women in promoting reconstruction and reducing social tensions.
Organizations like Pro-Femmes received a lot of international
support, which provided an important source of funding. These
resources enabled national women's organizations to undertake
large-scale ambitious projects. Women's organizations also
obtained the support of the Government of National Unity
("GNU"), Rwanda's interim government. A Ministry of Gender,
Family and Social Affairs 145 was included in the GNU from the
142 Id. at 98.
143 Id.
144 Within Rwanda, distinctions are made between recent returnees and "old
caseload refugees." Recent returnees are the Rwandans that fled the country after
the genocide, contrasted with the "old caseload refugees," who left Rwanda in
1959 and the early 1960s in response to widespread violence against Tutsi
Rwandans, and who returned to Rwanda after the RPF victory. WOMEN'S
COMM'N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN DELEGATION, RWANDA'S WOMEN AND
CHILDREN: THE LONG ROAD TO RECONCILIATION *5 (1997) (assessing the protection
and assistance needs of Rwandan women and children) [hereinafter THE LONG
ROAD]. The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children reports that
[flew of the projects supported by the Rwandan Women's Initiative or
other international organizations are benefiting refugee returnee groups
or Hutu-run associations. In fact, it was difficult for the Women's
Commission to interview recent returnees, as most of the programs are
set up to assist genocide survivors or are run by "old caseload" refugees,
people of Tutsi background who returned in the last three years from
Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and other countries.
Id. at *16.
145 This ministry was divided into the Ministry of Social Affairs and the
Ministry of Gender and Promotion of Women's Development in 1999. I will use
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beginning, and its first minister, Aloisea Inyumba, was a founding
member of the RPF. 146 She was born and raised in Uganda and
arrived in Rwanda in 1990. She was the youngest member of the
GNU and the only woman. Through the Ministry of Gender,
Family and Social Affairs, Inyumba organized national women's
networks to address women's problems similar to the projects
undertaken by Pro-Femmes. 147
All of these activities caused a dramatic increase in the number
of women's organizations throughout the country. A 1997 study
estimated that there was an average of 100 women's associations in
each of the country's 154 communes. 148 These organizations target
different populations. For example, organizations focus on
widows, orphans, girls, rural women, or women caring for
orphans. They are also involved in a range of activities, which
include shelter projects that assist female heads of households
repair damaged homes and build new ones; microcredit lending
programs; promoting women's legal rights, for example lobbying
to revise inheritance laws to remove gender discriminatory
provisions and assisting women and children in claiming their
rights in court; promoting education for girls; vocational training
and civic education for women; and medical assistance, both
physical and psychological. 1 49  These activities made the
organizations relevant in the lives of women across the country.
the acronym MIGEPROFE (Ministere du Genre et de la Promotion de la Femme)
to refer to the ministry both before and after the split.
146 The Arusha Peace Agreement had included a similar ministry, the
Ministry of Family Affairs and Promotion of the Status of Women, and it was
given to the MRND. Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note 22, art. 56.
147 Her program, the Rwanda Women's Initiative, is a national network of
women's organizations at the grassroots level. The initiative brings together
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa women to talk about their common needs and was funded
by the United States State Department and the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees. Inyumba has stated that, "[t]he first meetings were very difficult... I
organized week-long workshops for reconciliation. At the first sessions the
[Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa] women sat in separate comers, but they had to share
sleeping mats, soap, food. Finally, they had to acknowledge that they needed
each other." By the end of the workshop Inyumba noted that the women "opened
up to the possibility of working together to solve their common problems." Jane
Ciabattari, From Rwanda's Ashes, Women Are Building Anew, WOMEN'S ENEWS, Oct.
2, 2000, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=290 (last visited Oct. 22,
2007).
148 Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 100. A commune is a former
territorial administrative unit. Rwanda was divided into twelve prefectures,
which in turn were divided into 154 communes.
149 Id. at 100-11.
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The network of women's organizations throughout Rwanda
provided a foundation for mobilizing and developing a
constituency that would support a multi-faceted campaign to have
Rwanda's new constitution address gender equity.
4.1. Obtaining Influential Allies
Within Rwanda's political environment, a key facet of the
campaign was obtaining influential allies. The structure of the
public consultations gave gender equity advocates access to the
drafting body through public meetings and written submissions.
The cultivation of influential allies significantly increased that
access qualitatively and quantitatively. Women's organizations
developed strategic relationships with international organizations
like the UNIFEM, the Rwandan Forum of Women
Parliamentarians, and MIGEPROFE, the Rwandan ministry
responsible for gender issues.1,50  These various relationships
enabled gender equity advocates to assist in setting the agenda for
several LCC public meetings and to contribute to the LCC
substantive deliberations.
UNIFEM partnered with the LCC to organize sensitization
workshops throughout the country. These workshops took place
before the general LCC public consultation process began. One
UNIFEM-sponsored workshop in 2001 was for the LCC members
and other provincial government officials to provide information
about the general principles of the Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") and the role of
UNIFEM in Rwanda. 5 1 The other workshops took place in four
different provinces and were attended by at least one LCC
member. Rwanda's CEDAW obligations were also discussed in
these workshops. Questions raised during these workshops
covered topics such as marriage, polygamy, divorce, alleviating
150 The Forum of Women Parliamentarians is a caucus for women members
of parliament that was created with international funding and support. It seeks to
enable women parliamentarians to work together on issues across party lines.
Through the Forum, women parliamentarians review existing laws and propose
amendments to discriminatory laws, examine proposed legislation "with an eye
to gender sensitivity," liaise with women's organizations, and organize meetings
and training sessions to raise awareness about gender issues. INT'L INST.
DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS
160 Uulie Ballington & Azza Karam eds., 2005), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/wip2/ [hereinafter WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT].
151 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, supra note 124, at 1.
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women's poverty, women's representation in parliament,
education for girls, and the regulation of political parties. 152 By
holding these workshops before the LCC public consultation
program began, UNIFEM assisted gender equity advocates in
placing gender on the LCC agenda and having government
officials and citizens throughout the country begin thinking about
gender equity and the constitution. 153
These efforts were complemented by the earlier work by
MIGEPROFE. This ministry had been involved in sponsoring
gender mainstreaming workshops for government officials since
1999.154  MIGEPROFE also held workshops with religious
communities to discuss gender considerations in development. 55
These workshops along with those sponsored by UNIFEM
supported the grassroots consultation work undertaken by Pro-
Femmes. As a result of Pro-Femmes' consultation work, women
throughout the country were able to gain information about the
relationship between their concerns and gender equality, the role
of the constitution in promoting and protecting gender equality,
and various ways that gender equality can be promoted. 56
Participants in the workshops were also able to identify the issues
they felt were important to women, express their opinions and
ideas about those and other non-gender issues, and to propose and
discuss recommendations for addressing the problems
identified. 157 Finally, these workshops provided a forum for
organization leaders and government officials to encourage
women to participate in consultative forums on the constitution,
like the November 2002 national conference on the draft
constitution. 58 Part of encouraging women to participate in the
national forum included providing training on how to be effective
152 Id. at 2-4.
153 See infra text accompanying notes 211-12 for a discussion as to how these
sessions influenced the comments and suggestions made during the January to
June 2002 consultation.
154 ELIZABETH POWLEY, STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN
RWANDA'S TRANSITION 19 (2003), available at http://www.huntaltematives.org/
download/10_strengthening-govemancetherole of women in rwanda s
_transition.pdf.
155 Id.
156 Id.; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 17-18.
157 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 19; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at
17-18.
158 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 26.
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in the mixed gender forum. Traditional norms did not support
women speaking about their needs in public when men were
present.159 Women were instructed to: "[s]peak in a clear voice
and don't forget to introduce yourself before your comment;"
"[let's not make men think, as they've always thought, that
women talk too much: be brief;" and "[t]ry not to complain about
what we do not have but ask for what you need by making it a
suggestion." 160
This type of assistance in addition to female parliamentarians
serving as legal advisors informing the women about what to
expect and encouraging participation has been credited with
enabling women "to submit their ideas on equal footing with
men," which "made it difficult for those who were resistant to
women's contributions to dismiss them." 161
Pro-Femmes' relationship with the Forum of Women
Parliamentarians and MIGEPROFE was critical in ensuring that
proposals regarding women's political representation were
159 Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 112; WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra
note 150, at 157.
160 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 26.
161 Id. While some readers may find the advice given to women participating
in the national conference troubling because it suggests that women must speak
and behave "like men" in order to participate, it must be understood within the
context of a campaign that sought integration and inclusion rather than political
transformation. The women's organizations in Rwanda were not seeking to
radically reconstruct or transform politics and governance in Rwanda. Their
strategy was based on a basic acceptance of the governance system and political
structure created by the RPF. They prioritized inclusion within the RPF-led
government and as such focused on framing their needs, concerns, ideas, and
proposals in ways that fit within the status quo. This approach extended to forms
of communication and ways of making claims. The ability of gender equity
advocates to effectively convey the diverse range of their needs and concerns may
have been hampered by their strategic choices. See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 37
(discussing individuals' ability to convey their needs, concerns, and ideas if they
are limited to particular forms of communication).
It does not appear that there were significant debates or discussions amongst
the various actors within the Rwandan women's organizations about the
appropriate approach for addressing gender issues. It is possible that there were
advocates for both the moderate inclusion approach and a more radical
transformation approach. Both approaches have short-term and long-term costs
that play a role in the collective action frames utilized by SMOs and their
evaluation of the availability of political opportunities. See MCADAM, supra note
17, at 37-39 (evaluating distinctions between inclusive and radical approaches to
social change); ScHocK, supra note 90, at 27-28 (discussing factors relevant for
determining the availability of political opportunities); text accompanying notes
132-34.
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carefully reviewed and seriously considered by the LCC. The three
entities submitted a joint policy paper to the LCC with specific
proposals. The joint approach gave the proposals more political
weight than recommendations in individual submissions.162 When
the draft constitution was presented to the TNA, the members of
the Forum of Women Parliamentarians actively reviewed it to
ensure that matters relating to gender equity and women's political
participation were acceptable. 163 The relationship between the
women's organizations and Judith Kanakuze, one of the LCC civil
society representatives, was also important. Kanakuze became the
LCC gender expert and supported the proposals put forward by
women's organizations, the Forum of Women Parliamentarians,
and MIGEPROFE. Despite not having an official representative
within the LCC, women's organizations were able to create one
with Kanakuze. Her presence and support ensured that proposals
regarding women's political participation would be raised during
the LCC's deliberations. 6 4
Pro-Femmes not only relied on these relationships to have
topics discussed during the LCC deliberations, but also to monitor
the entire process. Berthe Mukamusoni, a parliamentarian,
recalled that " [w]hen writing the constitution, gender started off as
a separate chapter. We refused and said that it had to be
integrated." 165 The gender equity advocates had to monitor the
process to ensure that their proposals were included in various
drafts of the constitution and to see whether potentially
problematic text had been inserted. The gender equity advocates'
influential allies played an important role in providing the
advocates with the information necessary for effective monitoring.
Monitoring enables SMOs to conduct an ongoing assessment of
the constitution-making process. Such an assessment involves
gathering general information about the progression of the process,
how the rules governing the process are being adhered to, whether
there have been changes to those rules, and what influence
162 This is particularly so since the LCC weighted the submissions it received
and a detailed memorandum by a group received the most points. ANKUT, supra
note 7, at 18.
163 See, e.g., Commission Juridique et Constitutionnelle du Rwanda [Legal &
Const. Comm'n], Actualit, 2003, http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/actualite.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2007) (noting the review of the constitution by various
parliamentary committees).
164 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 26.
165 Women Taking a Lead, supra note 121, at 16.
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participants have had during the public consultation stage.
Disseminating the gathered information facilitates the mobilizing
function of SMOs. Adherence to the process as planned or
departures from it provide incentives for the public to participate
in subsequent activities, such as an approval referendum1
66
Influential allies assisted gender equity advocates in getting
their proposals and recommendations reviewed and considered by
the LCC, but the substance of those proposals and
recommendations was critical. What gender equity advocates
sought and how they framed their requests played a significant
role in their ability to obtain influential allies. In a post-conflict
context in which democratic political institutions and civil society
are embryonic, there will be significant hesitation to internally
include individuals or organizations that seek to challenge or
undermine the governance system advanced by the political
elites. 167  The differential access and success of organizations
166 See text accompanying notes 205-09 for a discussion of the monitoring
role that civil society organizations played in Kenya.
Approval referenda provide the last opportunity for the public to participate
in the constitution-making process. Mobilizing citizens to vote in the referendum
can provide a check on the drafting body's power by protecting the ideas,
concerns, and opinions of the public. When the draft inadequately addresses
concerns raised during the public consultation process, the referendum allows the
public to reject the draft and prevent the government from claiming the benefits of
a participatory process and enacting an unacceptable constitution.
Civil society organizations effectively performed this function in Zimbabwe.
President Mugabe established a Constitutional Commission in response to
demands from civil society organizations to revise the constitution. CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & DEV., THE ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM: THE REPORT OF
THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT OBSERVER MISSION 35 (2000),
[hereinafter ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM]. When the draft was put
before the public it was rejected. Id. at 54. The public was overwhelmingly
concerned that the draft ignored the concerns raised during the public
consultation process and that President Mugabe tried to use a democratic
constitutional review process to gain legitimacy for a marginally democratic
constitution. DEMOCRATIC CONSTrrUTION, supra note 5, at 9; ZIMBABWE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, supra, at 43-44, 54. While the public's efforts were
not successful in enacting the desired constitution, they were successful in
preventing political elites from using a participatory constitution review process
to ratify their uncompromised political arrangements. Civil society organizations
were able to influence not only the thinking of the general public and certain
political actors, but also the final decision. The effectiveness of the public's
participation was facilitated by a public sphere that did not overwhelmingly
hamper the existence and work of civil society organizations.
167 See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Moderating Politics in Post-Conflict States: An
Examination of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 41-58
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seeking gender equity versus those seeking robust multi-party
democracy suggest that successful proposals and
recommendations must be framed in ways that are consistent with
the political elite's governance frame and do not undermine the
existing distribution of political power.
4.2. Framing Constitutional Conversations
Individuals exist within a particular cultural context that is
comprised of "diverse, often conflicting symbols, rituals, stories,
and guides to action." 168 Culture is thus like a tool kit or repertoire
that individuals select from when making decisions. 169 Frames
help individuals organize the diverse symbols, images, and ideas
available within their repertoire into a coherent set of idea
elements. 170 This is done by linking the diverse information to an
underlying organizing idea that signals what is at stake on a given
issue. Frames affect what participants identify as problematic, who
they blame for such problems, and how they believe the problems
should be resolved. Frames also influence how individuals
evaluate claims made by other people, including who is qualified
to speak on particular issues and what type of knowledge or
information is valuable. 171  Through strategic framing, SMOs
(2005) (examining resistance by Bosnian nationalist government officials to
political participation by moderate politicians).
168 Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 273, 277 (1986).
169 See id. (characterizing culture as a "tool kit" for constructing "strategies of
action."); Michael Moody & Laurent ThCvenot, Comparing Models of Strategy,
Interests, and the Public Good in French and American Environmental Disputes, in
RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY: REPERTOIRES OF EVALUATION IN
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 229, 275 (Mich!le Lamont & Laurent Th~venot
eds., 2000) [hereinafter RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY]
(examining the strategic use of different "cultural repertoires."); Laurent
Th~venot, Michael Moody & Claudette Lafaye, Forms of Valuing Nature: Arguments
and Modes of Justification in French and American Environmental Disputes, in
RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 238 (setting out the
notion of "repertoires" of cultural resources used in the "justification, preparation,
or explanation of action.").
170 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 105 (frames are the
"central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea
elements."); Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 614 (citing Goffman's definition of
frames as schemes of interpretation that "enable individuals 'to locate, perceive,
identify, and label' occurrences within their life space and the world at large.");
Noonan, supra note 137, at 85.
171 Framing thus privileges "certain meaning elements at the cost of others"
and creates a "built-in preference structure." SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra
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attempt to align their definition of a problem and proposed
solutions with the interpretive framework of other members of the
society. This requires enabling individuals to see that some set of
their interests, values, and beliefs are congruent and
complementary with the organization's activities, goals, and
ideology. 172
Framing and framing contests take place within a society's
discursive opportunity structure. This is a society's framework of
ideas and "meaning-making" institutions, which can be divided
into three broad categories: political, socio-cultural, and mass
media. 173 It is part of the broader political opportunity structure of
a society. 174 The political components include the government and
the role of the state and political parties within the society. 175 The
note 137, at xii-xiii; see also Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 614 (arguing that
frames help to render events meaningful and function to organize experience and
guide action); Snow et al., supra note 129, at 464 ("By rendering events or
occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action,
whether individual or collective."). There is usually a predominant direction that
a frame favors and it is generally used to support that direction. SHAPING
ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 106. The same frame can be used to
support different policy positions although it is "easier for an actor to be in line
with the built-in preference structure of the frame chosen." Id. at xiii. For
example, Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht's work on abortion discourse in
the United States and Germany demonstrates that while the "Fetal Life" frame can
be used to support pro-life, pro-choice, and neutral positions, its predominant
direction is that of pro-life. Id. at 106. Frames should not be conflated with policy
positions because despite the predominant direction of a frame, it can support
alternative policy positions. For example, the "Fetal Life" frame can be used to
support a variety of policy positions. Pro-life advocates would contend that "Life
begins at conception," while pro-choice supporters would state that "Life begins
at birth," and individuals neutral on the matter would state that "the real issue is
when life begins." Id.
172 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 615; McAdam, supra note 133, at 340;
Snow, et al., supra note 129, at 467.
173 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 62; see also Mich~le
Lamont & Laurent Th~venot, Introduction: Toward a Renewed Comparative Cultural
Sociology, in RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 169, at 8;
Swidler, supra note 168, at 277 (examining culture tool-kits and repertoires in
action); Laurent Th~venot, Michael Moody & Claudette Lafaye, supra note 169, at
238 (discussing framing in the context of social movements).
174 See supra note 108 for further discussion of political opportunities.
175 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 64. Ferree et al.,
developed this typology studying the United States and Germany. Consequently,
their conception of the discourse opportunity structure is rooted in the
experiences of developed western democracies. The specific details of each
component will vary in post-conflict states, particularly the political and mass
media components. For example, political parties may be non-existent and there
may be few mass media resources at the disposal of individuals and civil society
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socio-cultural components include the worldviews, values, norms,
ways of thinking, practices, and resources within a society and the
rules that support these elements. 176  The socio-cultural
components "provide a pool of potential legitimating devices for
particular ways of framing an issue and justifying one's position on
it."177 Finally, the mass media includes journalistic outlets like
newspapers, television, and radio.
Some frames are advantaged because the ideas and language of
the frame "resonate with the broader culture[,]" which makes the
frame appear natural and familiar. 78 Credibility and salience are
two interacting factors that affect frame resonance. Credibility is a
function of three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility,
and the credibility of those advancing the frame. 79  Frame
consistency refers to the congruency between an organization's
beliefs, claims, and actions. Contradictions or inconsistencies can
exist between an organization's beliefs or claims, or they can exist
between an organization's framing and its tactical actions.
180
Greater and more apparent contradictions decrease frame
resonance and negatively affect frame acceptance. Empirical
credibility relates to the fit between the proffered frame and the
target audience's understanding of events in the world. The more
culturally believable the evidence is and the more of it there is, the
more credible the frame and the broader its appeal. Finally, the
more credibly a speaker is regarded, the more persuasive he or she
will be. The greater the target audience perceives the status and
experience of a frame articulator and the organization he or she
represents to be, the more resonant and plausible the frame and
claims will be. 181
Salience is the other factor that affects resonance, and it has
three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and
organizations. The basic framework, however, is useful in sketching the
framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions within a society.
176 Id. at 70.
177 Id. They also offer varying opportunities to competing framers as they try
to link their framing of an issue to broader "cultural symbols, themes, and
narratives." Id.
178 Id.
179 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 619; David A. Snow & Robert D.
Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, 1 INT'L SOC.
MOVEMENT RES. 197 (1988).
180 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 620; Snow & Benford, supra note 179.
181 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 620-21.
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narrative fidelity. Centrality is a measure of how essential the
beliefs, values, and ideas of the organization's frame are to the lives
of the target audience. Whether or not the frames are congruent or
resonant with the everyday personal experiences of these actors
reflects the second dimension. If the frames are too abstract or
distant, they will have little salience. Finally, a link between
particular frames and cultural narratives, myths, or inherent
ideology supports cultural resonance.
In their efforts to ensure that the particular needs of women
and children were addressed during the reconstruction of Rwanda,
gender equity advocates sought to increase women's political
participation. Accepting the GNU's desire to foster peace, unity,
and reconciliation, gender equity advocates proclaimed that
achieving this common good could not be attained without the
active participation of women in politics. The gender-focused
frame stated that because of women's skills, their unifying
activities after the genocide, the significant number of women
heading households, and the majority female population after the
genocide, they were necessary for the social, political, and
economic reconstruction of Rwanda.182 Gender equity advocates
were able to frame their concerns regarding the hardships facing
women and children and gender equity as consistent with
concerns underlying the quest for unity and reconciliation.
The ability of civil society organizations to obtain their desired
outcomes is partially contingent upon developing coherent and
well-articulated accounts that define the problem, assign blame,
and determine what should be done to remedy the identified
problem. 183 Two core framing functions, diagnosis and prognosis,
assist in developing the necessary accounts. 184
182 WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at 157-60; see also ANKUT, supra
note 7, at 14 (describing the arguments of women's organizations); POWLEY, supra
note 154, at 15-17 (discussing social belief in the importance of women in
Rwanda's peace building and reconciliation efforts); Newbury & Baldwin, supra
note 139, at 98, 104-05 (describing growth of women's political organizations in
Rwanda).
183 Cress and Snow found that the successful attainment of desired outcomes
by homeless social movement organizations required viable organizations with
articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing. These two factors were necessary,
but not sufficient for the successful attainment of outcomes. Other factors were
present and necessary under different conditions. Cress & Snow, supra note 135,
at 1096.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 134-36 for additional information on
diagnostic and prognostic frames.
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Gender equity advocates developed a frame that identified the
unique predicaments of women and children in post-conflict
Rwanda as not only public problems in need of political solutions,
but as threats to the state's unity and reconciliation. 185 This frame
also advanced women's political participation as a means for
addressing the identified problems. Gender equity advocates were
able to align their gendered frame with the GNU's unity and
reconciliation frame by bridging the two. 186
Connecting gender equity issues and women's political
participation to unity and reconciliation in Rwanda was an
important move in a political climate where differentiated political
representation was disfavored. Multi-party democracy was
significantly limited out of fear that party mobilization might
promote ethnic divisionism. Despite the fact that claims for
women's guaranteed political participation and multi-party
democracy both sought to broaden the public's choices for political
representation, the socio-cultural components of the discursive
opportunity structure in Rwanda challenged proponents of multi-
party democracy in ways that did not challenge women's
organizations, but actually supported them. Gender was not
perceived as a social difference that could divide the society in the
same way and to the same extent that ethnicity had in the past.
Rwanda's past experiences with mass violence were episodes in
which ethnic-based hatred was fostered and exploited. Gender
differences had never led to similar incidents of mass expulsions
and violence. Incidentally, in post-genocide Rwanda gender
differences were often perceived as beneficial for women. Many
members of society viewed women as symbols of moderation as a
result of being less involved in the 1994 genocidal violence, less
corrupt and more attentive and accessible to their communities,
and willing and able to play key roles in the state's
reconstruction. 187
185 These problems included the financial and social challenges for female-
headed households; lack of suitable shelter, care for orphans, and medical needs;
and limited access to food production resources.
186 Frame bridging links "two or more ideologically congruent but
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem." Snow
et al., supra note 129, at 467; see, e.g., Tracey Skillington, Politics and the Struggle to
Define: A Discourse Analysis of the Framing Strategies of Competing Actors in a 'New'
Participatory Forum, 48 BRIT. J. Soc. 493, 498 (1997) (exemplifying frame-bridging in
the environmental policy context).
187 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 15-17; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121,
at 12-13; see also Noonan, supra note 137, at 91-98 (1995) (examining how women
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Domestic support for multi-party democracy was not as strong
or as organized as that for women's political participation. Claims
advocating multi-party democracy could not be ignored because
the international community, which had been the initial impetus
for change in 1991, endorsed such claims. 188 Support from political
actors and within the society at large was mixed because political
parties, ethnic divisions, and mass violence were strongly
connected for many people. 189 Historically political parties in
Rwanda were ethnic parties and the parties that developed in the
1990s followed that pattern. The parties that participated in the
GNU had specific ethnic identities even though such matters were
not discussed openly.190 In 1995, Kagame feared that multi-party
local elections would undermine the development of national
unity.191 The MDR, the party with the most to gain through multi-
in Chile used dominant cultural and political themes regarding gender roles to
create a frame that legitimated their protests).
188 See PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 89-90 (discussing France's push for multi-
party democracy in Rwanda). International or world polity norms can be
particularly influential in shaping the decisions a state makes regarding its
governance structure, the rights it protects, and the manner in which it protects
those rights. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTL ORG. 887 (1998) (reviewing norms and
ideational phenomena in the international context); Ryan Goodman & Derek
Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (discussing ways in which states influence the behavior of
other states); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) (examining the ways in which global
social constraints empower and constrain institutional and state actors); John W.
Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco 0. Ramirez, World Society and
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144 (1997) (analyzing nation-states as institutions
shaped by worldwide cultural and associational processes).
189 See, e.g., Rwanda: Finally an Election, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, June 13, 2003, at 1,
4-5 (noting the importance of ethnic divisions in recent elections); Fundamental
Ideas Report, supra note 63 (suggesting that constitutional limits be placed on the
number of political parties in Rwanda).
190 See, e.g., PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 121-26 (examining the existence of
multi-party politics); Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 113-14 (discussing
women's political organizations in post-genocide Rwanda).
191 President Kagame asked:
Multi-partyism in African societies, what does it mean? I use any tactic
to distinguish myself from my neighbour in order to get more votes than
him. In this game, it does not really matter if I lie. In the current process,
if you authorise elections, at this present time, you will never build that
country. You will never have a united country. We won't have
democracy: people are going to rush on one another.
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party democracy as arguably the strongest opposition party, also
had a lot to maintain under the existing regime. The party was a
significant participant within the GNU and it did not engage in the
same sort of organization, strategic framing, and mobilizing as the
gender equity advocates. The MDR supported the vague rules
governing divisionism and political parties and as a party did not
aggressively contest the Transitional National Assembly's decision
to disband the MDR. For example, when Prime Minister Bernard
Makuza, an MDR member, was asked about the banning of MDR,
he stated:
It is regrettable that MDR had ample time to modify its
message and public perception of it. There was so much
effort on my part to reform the party but I failed.
Parliament made an inquiry and referred the matter to
cabinet, which in turn referred it to the courts. That is the
rule of law. There is consensus in government and
parliament to ban the party. And we must all accept the
rule of law and the principles of democracy. 192
A parliamentary commission was created to examine claims of
divisionism by the MDR in 2002. Before the commission began its
work, a leading figure within the MDR who was close to the RPF
believed the party would be abolished. 193 The party was suffering
from internal divisions, which likely contributed to the lack of
MDR-generated mobilization to prevent its dissolution and to
support multi-party democracy. 94
In the absence of strong organized domestic mobilization
around the importance of multi-party democracy and the
importance of political opposition, the predominant fears
associated with multi-party democracy prevailed. In accordance
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, "CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY" IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA:
EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS, AFRICA REPORT No. 34, at 4
(2001), available at http://www.crisisgroup .org/home/index.cfm?id=1647&=1.
192 Rwanda: A Country Profile-Prime Minister Talks About Progress over the
Years, DAILY MONITOR (2003), http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/
mplsups/rwandasup/rwsup5.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (Ugandan newspaper
online).
193 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS: TIGHTENING CONTROL IN
THE NAME OF UNITY 4-5 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/
africa/rwanda0503bck.pdf.
194 Id. at 5. Some members of the MDR joined the RPF, which gave them a
political future without having to fight for the existence of the MDR.
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with international norms regarding democratic governance, the
Constitution states that "[a] multi-party system of government is
recognized." 195 The 2003 Constitution, however, limited political
parties to maintaining offices at the national and provincial
levels, 196 and subjected political parties to a law on political
organizations, which together with the Constitution, enabled the
Senate to refer a political party to the High Court of the Republic
for promoting divisionism 97 Divisionism is not defined in the
Constitution or in the law governing political parties. 98 All of
these factors reduce the likelihood that robust opposition parties
will develop in Rwanda.
While supporters of multi-party democracy did not organize in
the same way that gender equity advocates did, gender equity
advocates needed more than effective framing strategies. They
had to convince fellow citizens of the appropriateness of their
proposals and mobilize citizens to vote in the approval
referendum.
4.3. Mobilizing
The development of a frame that was consistent with the RPF's
governance frame was important for gender equity advocates'
success. It enabled advocates to present proposals regarding
gender equity in ways that LCC members and other political elites
could "hear" and accept as non-threatening to their political
power. As women's organizations used their influential allies,
such as Kanakuze and UNIFEM to obtain LCC support, they also
worked to expand their grassroots support throughout Rwanda.
The Constitution had to be approved in a national referendum
before it could be adopted. Developing a national constituency for
195 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 52.
196 This provision was amended in December 2005 to state that political
parties may establish offices at the national and provincial level. They are no
longer prohibited from establishing officials at the local levels of territorial
administration. Amendment No. 2 of Aug. 12, 2005, CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA art. 2, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA.
197 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 55; Organic Law Governing
Political Organizations and Politicians, No. 16/2003 art. 42, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 42, No. 42 special (June 27, 2003).
198 The MDR was dissolved based on a finding by a parliamentary committee
that it promoted divisionism. The process used to dissolve the MDR was not
included in either the Constitution or organic law. The investigation into the
MDR began before the adoption of the new Constitution or the promulgation of
organic law governing political parties.
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constitutional provisions advancing women's political
participation and representation was important for two reasons.
First, it provided women's organizations with leverage when
presenting proposals to the LCC. With substantial support behind
their proposals the organizations could suggest that any
constitution put to an approval referendum that did not
adequately address women's political participation and
representation would likely be defeated. In 2002, women were
52.3% of the total population and 54.1% of the population aged 20
to 64.199 Mobilizing a significant portion of the female population
could be instrumental in determining whether an approval
referendum would be successful. 200  Additionally, women's
organizations likely played a significant role in shaping the
public's perception of the legitimacy and fairness of the
constitution-making process. Moehler's research on Uganda's
constitution-making process found that citizens lacked the
necessary information to independently evaluate the constitution-
making process and the constitution, so they relied on information
from local elites. When the local elites were supportive of the
process, citizens described the process as fair and legitimate;
however, when the local elites were antagonistic, they conveyed
messages of bias and unfairness to the public.201 Thus messages
199 U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, 2003 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK at table
7, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.R/34, U.N. Sales No. E/F.06.XIII.1 (2006)
(Population by age, sex and urban/rural residence: latest available year, 1994-
2003) (Rwanda data from 2002).
200 Without essentializing women and suggesting that all women would
support the gender equity advocates' proposals, I note the percentage of women
voters because the "women are necessary" frame targeted all women regardless of
class or ethnicity. The advocates pursuing the constitutional provisions sought to
unify women across all lines of potential cleavage and saw the quest for women's
political participation as universal for all women. Many of the activities
organized by the gender ministry and the various women's organizations sought
to enable women to see their commonality and focus on that in improving the
lives of all women. This was difficult at times because some of the women's
organizations were ethnically homogeneous in practice, but this was something
that was not openly discussed. See Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 105.
This approach to gender is reflected in the block of women's seats reserved in the
Chamber of Deputies. Women do not run as members of political parties or as
formal representatives of any interest other than women's interests.
201 See Moehler, supra note 12, at 26 (explaining how the opinions of local
leaders shaped citizens' evaluations of the constitution). Moehler found that the
relationship between citizen participation and support for the Constitution was
weak; as citizen participation increased, support for the Constitution did not
increase significantly. Id. at 23. She concludes that the views of local elites were
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1
from Rwandan women's organizations to their constituents that
their concerns were being ignored or that the process was biased or
unfair could have been detrimental to the adoption of the
Constitution as it was in Kenya.
Public concern over the substance of the constitution presented
to the Kenyan public for approval led to its defeat. 20 2 The Kenyan
Parliament enacted a law, the Consensus Act, which altered the
constitutional review procedures set out in the Constitution of
Kenya Review Act.203 The Constitution of Kenya Review
Commission was to conduct, promote, and facilitate civic
education to stimulate public discussion and awareness of
constitutional issues; set up district-level documentation centers;
create a constituency constitutional forum; conduct public hearings
to collect public views; and prepare a report and recommendations
based on the views obtained that would serve as the basis for
debate at a National Constitutional Conference. 2 4 The national
conference participants included 223 members of parliament, 210
district representative, 126 representatives from civil society and
other interest groups, and 41 representatives of political parties.
205
The conference was held in Bomas, Kenya, beginning on April 30,
2003, and lasted approximately one month. The draft constitution
more influential in shaping how individuals evaluated the constitution-making
process and the resulting Constitution. Id. at 30.
202 See James A. Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing
and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
203 Parliament enacted the Constitution of Kenya Review Act in 2000 to
facilitate a comprehensive review of the constitution. The act called for the
public's participation in the review process, providing the first opportunity for
everyday Kenyans to take part in reviewing the constitution. See Hassan, supra
note 76 (providing the first comprehensive review of Kenya's constitution since
the Lancaster House Constitution was adopted in 1963). Kenya's constitution was
amended significantly between 1965 and 1967 to centralize powers that had been
decentralized in the Lancaster House Constitution. The two major Kenyan
parties, KANU and KADU, agreed to a decentralized system because they
favored a regional-based system that provided for an equitable distribution of the
country's resources. See Joseph Martin Shikuku, Building on the Lancaster House
Experience (Sept. 15, 2001), available at http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/
KECKRC/2001/5.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (paper presented to the
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Workshop on the Interpretation of its
Mandate) (providing a brief history of the development of the Kenya
Constitution).
204 Hassan, supra note 76, at *2.
205 Id.; see NA'L CONST. CONFERENCE HANDBOOK (2003). The twenty-nine
Constitution of Kenya Review Commissioners would be appointed by parliament
and the president, but would not vote at the conference.
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agreed upon in Bomas-the Bomas Draft -significantly curtailed
presidential powers and introduced an elected prime minister who
would chair cabinet meetings, coordinate the work of the
government ministries, and prepare legislation.206
The Consensus Act authorized Parliament to unilaterally revise
the draft constitution prepared during the National Constitutional
Conference. Civil society organizations were actively involved in
publicizing the fact that Parliament was considering the act and the
effect it would have on the constitutional review process. Despite
the protests that ensued, Parliament passed the Consensus Act and
relied on it to revise the Bomas Draft. The Parliament-revised
constitution, the Kilifi Draft, strengthened presidential powers and
retained the prime minister position, but made it a position
appointed by the president rather than an elected position. Civil
society organizations were unsuccessful in preventing Parliament
from revising the Bomas Draft, but it undoubtedly helped civil
society organizations mobilize their communities to ensure that the
internal inclusion achieved during the National Constitutional
Conference would not be destroyed by approving the Kilifi Draft.
They were successful in this effort. The Kilifi Draft was rejected in
the November 21, 2005, referendum with 43% of voters supporting
the draft and 57% rejecting it.207
The second reason developing a national constituency that
supported constitutional provisions regarding women's political
participation and representation was important was to respond to
counterarguments potentially advanced by other citizens or civil
society organizations. Many of the accounts about the quest for
constitutional provisions addressing women's political
participation note the tensions between traditional Rwandan
norms regarding women in public spaces and the calls for
women's independent representation and participation within a
national legislative body. 208  To address the inevitable
206 These revisions address the concerns Kenyans expressed during the
CKRC's public hearings. It has been reported that "the majority of Kenyans
prefer the powers of the president trimmed and shared out with a proposed office
of the prime minister to guard against abuse of power." Joyce Mulama, Challenges
2005-2006: Kenya's New Constitution in Limbo, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 2005,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31456.
207 Nixon Ng'ang'a & Ben Agina, Resounding No, THE STANDARD, Nov. 23,
2005, http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hm-news/news.php?articleid
=32609.
208 Louis Rusa, director of the Division of Gender, Health, and Social Affairs
for Kigali-Ngali Province stated that he tries to "train men and women to 'show
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counterarguments and the development of public support for
those arguments it was important for gender equity advocates to
disseminate their "women are necessary" frame in public. Just as
significant public support for women's political participation
provisions could lead to a veto of an unresponsive constitution, a
responsive constitution could cause rejection by opponents.
International organizations concerned about women's issues
played a significant role in focusing Rwandan NGO attention on
governance matters and financially supporting the domestic
mobilization effort.209 The success of this collaboration is reflected
in the LCC report, Fundamental Ideas on the New Constitution,
presenting the results of the public consultation process. With
regard to gender the report states that citizens thought that gender
equity was achievable if individuals are equal before the law.
Furthermore, gender-based affirmative action should be provided
by law, protected in decision-making bodies, education, and the
economy. 210 These statements reflect the content discussed at the
sensitization workshops organized by international organizations
like UNIFEM to educate the population about Rwanda's
international legal obligations regarding gender.
As discussed at the beginning of this Section, there was a
proliferation of women's organizations throughout Rwanda after
the genocide to provide women with concrete support in
reconstructing their lives. These organizations were critically
important in enabling international organizations like UNIFEM
and local NGOs like Pro-Femmes to form a national network.
them the benefits of the promotion of women, that they can contribute to the
family, [and] that development cannot come from men only," but that "some men
are 'very resistant [to the inclusion of gender issues and women in government]
because of culture.'" POWLEY, supra note 154, at 19-20 (alterations in the original).
Berthe Mukamusoni, a female parliamentarian, noted that, "[i]n the history of our
country and society, women could not go in public with men. Where men were,
women were not supposed to talk, to show their needs. Men were to talk and
think for them." Id. at 21.
209 The influential role that international women's organizations, like
UNIFEM, were able to play in Rwanda through financial and political support
demonstrates the power that women and feminist ideas have and are gaining in
international settings. See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir &
Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006) (discussing the growth of
Governance Feminism or the "the installation of feminist and feminist ideas in
actual legal-institutional power.").
210 Fundamental Ideas Report, supra note 63.
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Through this network they were able to develop national support
for constitutional provisions guaranteeing women's political
participation and representation. The process of developing such
support began with the gender sensitization workshops. Madeline
Mukarwigema was a member of Duhozanye - an organization that
worked to respond to the urgent needs of 330 widows and
widowers- through which she received gender training.
Mukarwigema reported that before the training she and other
Duhozanye members never realized the gendered nature of their
struggles.
We never took gender into consideration. We saw
ourselves as widows who were trying to get by.... Before
we received training in gender, we thought that we had
arrived at the summit of sexual equality because we were
doing jobs and tasks which had previously been reserved
for men only, like masonry, milking cows etc... [.] After the
training, we saw that we had an incomplete understanding
of gender. 21'
The sensitization workshops and other meetings and
interactions with women throughout the country used the "women
are necessary" frame to discuss the problems facing women in
post-genocide Rwanda and offered women's political
representation and participation as a solution. Not only were
women told that political representation and participation were
important aspects of gender equity, the gender equity advocates
also reinforced the prevalent belief amongst women that women
were critically important for the reconstruction of post-genocide
Rwanda. 212  The organizations argued that constitutionally
guaranteed political representation was necessary to ensure that
women would be able to play the roles they desired in planning
and implementing the state's reconstruction. 213
211 WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 17-18 (second omission in the
original).
212 See, e.g., id. at 25-28 (explaining the process and importance of gender
education and training in Rwanda).
213 See, e.g., id. at 27 (arguing the importance of women in elected positions);
see also Heather B. Hamilton, Rwanda's Women: The Key to Reconstruction, J.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, Jan. 10, 2000, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/
rw/rwb.nsf/db900SD/OCHA-64CR56?OpenDocument; Jeanne Izabiliza, The
Role of Women in Reconstruction: Experience of Rwanda 2-4, Presentation
Delivered at Empowering Women in the Great Lakes Region: Violence, Peace, and
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Gender equity advocates were successful in obtaining their
desired constitutional guarantees as a result of their collective
action. Through Pro-Femmes, these advocates successfully
mobilized, obtained elite allies, and created and implemented an
effective framing strategy. It was these factors that enabled gender
equity advocates to make substantive contributions in a
constitution-making system that limited internal inclusion to
political elites and their allies. Rwanda adopted an external
participatory system. Rather than opening the floodgates of
participatory democratic governance, the use of this system
severely limited who within the society would be able to make
substantive contributions. This opportunity was limited to those
who became political insiders, which was not equally available to
all citizens and required tightly orchestrated collective action.214
Women's Leadership Conference (June 2005) (available at
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URLID=9184&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC
&URLSECTION=201.html) (advocating for an increase in female participation in
decision-making and policy implementation as the most effective means of
contribution to reconciliation efforts).
214 Soon after the war and genocide ended in Rwanda, women's
organizations reappeared to help women deal with the unique challenges they
were facing as widows, mothers, and heads of households. Through meetings
and activities to address practical challenges like access to income-generating
activities, shelter, food production resources, and the care of orphans, women
began to discuss the need for political solutions and political representation. See,
e.g., Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 98 (explaining the development of
informal and formal women's organizations after the 1994 genocide); see POWLEY,
supra note 154, at 19 (discussing the Rwandan Ministry of Gender and Women in
Development programs for women's empowerment); WOMEN TAKING A LEAD,
supra note 121, at 17-18 (providing narratives of Rwandan women who have
become involved in gender work). Through collaborations with female members
of parliament and the ministry in charge of gender issues, sensitization
workshops were held throughout the country.
Pro-Femmes worked closely with MIGEPROFE, the Forum of Women
Parliamentarians, and the LCC to ensure that their concerns were adequately
addressed in the draft constitution. See WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at
143, 146 (describing decision-making process); WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note
121, at 16. Once Pro-Femmes was satisfied that its issues were sufficiently
reflected in the draft constitution, the organization implemented a mobilization
campaign to encourage women to support the draft constitution in the national
referendum. See WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at 146 (explaining how
Pro-Femmes publicized the relevant changes to the draft constitution); WOMEN
TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 16 (discussing the inclusion of women and
women's issues in the drafting of the new Rwandan constitution). Through their
member NGOs and the network established during the sensitization process, Pro-
Femmes was able to access women throughout the country and follow up on their
earlier education and consultation work to encourage women to vote in support
of the constitution in the national referendum. The positive reports from Pro-
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5. CONCLUSION
Gender equity advocates successfully obtained their desired
outcomes -constitutional provisions guaranteeing women's
political participation and representation, and gender equity in
public and private life-through an external participatory system.
Their success resulted from engaging in sustained collective action
that entailed mobilizing, obtaining influential allies, and
implementing an effective framing strategy. The Rwandan case
study suggests that the use of external participatory systems has
the potential to assist in implementing moderate democratic
reforms. The focus of these systems on gaining legitimacy and
public support provides an opportunity for organized
constituencies to successfully lobby for democratic reforms that are
consistent with the elite-created governance plan. The quest for
legitimacy and public support is, however, balanced with a desire
to implement a specific governance system that maintains a
particular balance of power.
Historical experiences with politics and political power being a
zero-sum game cause many new political leaders in post-conflict
states a great deal of anxiety about the prospect of losing political
power. The loss of political power would mean not only losing
political influence, but becoming vulnerable to political, economic,
and social marginalization. Creating a public-driven governance
system and constitution is likely to be seen as a risky venture that
other political organizations within the state could take advantage
of to gain exclusive political power. The security conditions,
nascent political institutions, and civil society in post-conflict states
make this likelihood a distinct possibility. Thus external
participatory systems are likely to prevail in post-conflict states.
They enable the governing elites to create the blueprint for the
state's constitution and governance system, obtain public support,
and develop domestic legitimacy. The institutions, procedures,
and modes of participation utilized in an external participatory
system focus on obtaining support and legitimacy for a specific
governance plan at the expense of engaging the public in creating a
long-term effective governance system. Participatory constitution
making is supported by numerous states, inter-governmental
Femmes and other women's organizations regarding the legitimacy and fairness
of the process and the substance of the Constitution undoubtedly played a
significant role in the overwhelming support for the Constitution amongst citizens
concerned about gender equity. See Moehler, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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organizations, and non-governmental organizations because it is
seen as having the potential of facilitating national conversations
about the endemic political, economic, and social problems facing
the society. The conversations, discussions, and deliberations are
seen as providing forums in which workable solutions can be
identified, agreed upon, and memorialized in a constitution.
External participatory systems do not, however, enable these
challenging conversations and deliberations to take place within
the decision-making forums. Public support and legitimacy are
important aspects of democratic governance, but they will be
difficult to sustain if the government does not effectively address
political, economic, and social exclusion.
The challenge facing international legal scholars and
practitioners is how to assist the governments of post-conflict
states in transitioning from the use of external participatory
systems to internal participatory systems. This transition involves
citizens and political elites seeing politics and political power as
something other than a zero-sum game and viewing disagreement
and dissent as necessary components of democratic dialogue.
Recognizing the differences in the intent of the designers of such
systems and the institutions and procedures utilized provides a
starting point for thinking about how to structure such a transition.
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